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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee /Petitioner,

Supreme Court Case No. 20170304
Court of Appeals Case No. 20140602-CA
District Court Case No. 131902542

v.

Juvenile Court Case No. 1003447
COOPERJOHN ANTHONY VAN
HUIZEN,
Appellant/Respondent.

JURISDICTION

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) and (5) provide the Court's jurisdiction
over the juvenile court's rulings and the court of appeals' decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
1. Are Van Huizen's preservation and prejudice analyses correct?
This Court reviews the court of appeals' legal analysis for correctness. E.g.
D.J. Inv. Group, LLC v. DAE/Westbrook, LLC, 2006 UT 62, ~10, 147 P.3d 414.
The court of appeals reached these issues that are thus preserved. See,~
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ii 16, 61 P.3d 1062.
2. Was counsel ineffective during the Serious Youth Offender prelirninary

hearing?
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This Court addresses claims of ineffective assistance of counsel not ruled on

by lower courts as matters of law.

~!>

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah

App. 1992).

3. Do the juvenile court's misintetpretations of the Serious Youth Offender
statute constitute plain error and establish prejudice from the failure to self-recuse?

The juvenile court's statuto1-y interpretations and applications of the Serious
Youth Offender Act are legal conclusions entitled to no deference on appeal. E.g. In
re F.L., 2015 UT App 224, iJ17, 359 P.3d 693.

The plain error doctrine requires proof of an obvious and prejudicial error,
and provides relief from less obvious but highly prejudicial errors. See,~ State v.
Eldredg~, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
Issues 2 and 3 were raised in the adult district court after sentencing (R. 80-99,

110-112, 219-235, 414-456, 472-92, 508-524). The district court refused to hold a
hearing or reach the merits of the claims (R. 464-65, 586-98).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §78a-6-702 (2013), Utah Code Jud. Admin R. 1.2 and 2.11.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992), and State v.

Van Huizen, 2017 UT App 30,392 P.3d 933, correctly hold it is the duty of our
judges to protect the integrity of our judicial system by identifying the judges'

relationships that might pose conflicts of interest and require their disqualification.
2
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•

Reichert. at 25 7 n. 7; Van H uizen, ii 17.
Van Huizen correctly applied In re D.B., 2012 UT 65,, 34, 289 P.3d 459, a
case decided under the exceptional circumstances doctrine, in ruling that because
Cooper was not aware of the juvenile court judge's marriage to the C~ef Deputy of
the Criminal Division of the prosecuting office in time to move for disqualification,
Cooper would not be faulted for failing to preserve the disqualification issue. Van
Huizen, ii 50 n.15.
The court correctly applied Reichert, in granting relief absent a traditional
showing of prejudice. The coU1i: recognized that the_ burden did not shift to Cooper
to establish prejudice on appeal under State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah

1988), and State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998), because Cooper was
unaware of and thus had no opportunity to raise the disqualification issue through the
Rule 29 disqualification process, wherein a reviewing judge would have vetted the
disqualification issue. Van Huizen at~~ 53-56. The court properly applied Reichert
because the bindover decision was made solely by the judge and did not have a jury
or intetvening decision maker to ameliorate the effects of any partiality of the judge.
Van Huizen at~, 57-59, 63-64.
Plain errors in the bindover order provide alternate bases for affirmance and
establish prejudice from the court's failure to self-recuse.
Ineffective assistance of counsel at the SYO preliminary hearing provides
alternative bases for affirmance of the reversal of the bindover order. Trial counsel's
performance was objectively deficient, as counsel failed to prepare and advocate

3
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properly in the SYO preliminaty hearing. Counsel failed to investigate the facts and
the law, and did not inform the court that the SYO statute changed drastically in

juveniles' favor over seven months prior to Cooper's SYO preliminary hearing. His
omissions were not conceivably reasonably strategic. There is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result absent counsel's objectively deficient perfo1mance.
Individually and cumulatively, 1 the foregoing errors justify affirmance.

ARGUMENTS

VAN HUIZEN IS CORRECTLY DECIDED.

I.

A.

VAN HUIZEN SQUARES WITH THIS COURT'S
PRECEDENTS ON PRESERVATION.
1.

Van Huizen Correctly Applies D.B.

The preservation requirement ensures that trial courts have the opportunity to
correct errors prior to appeal, and prevents parties from taking advantage on appeal

•

of claims they opted not to raise in the u-ial courts. E.g. Scott v. Scott, 2017 UT 66, ,I
15, _

P.3d _ . Neither function would be served by applying the preservation

mle to Cooper's failure to move to disqualify the judge, because Cooper was unaware
of and the court did not disclose her marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy of the
prosecuting office in time for Cooper to move for the judge's disqualification (R. 428,
657, 659-662).
1 The

cumulative error doctrine involves consideration of all identified and
assumed errors., and requires reversal if the errors undermine the Court's confidence
in the fairness of the proceedings. See,~ State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,r 13,
275 P.3d 1050.

4
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•

T'he State faults the court of appeals for not applying the preservation rule.

State's brief at 17-32. It fails to acknowledge that Van I-Iuizen is applying In re D.B.,

2012 UT 65, if 34, 289 P.3d 459, in holding the general burden to preserve the
disqualification claim is not fairly cast on Cooper, because he did not have notice of
the disqualifying facts, and thus had no opportunity to raise the disqualification claim
in juvenile court. Van Huizen, 2017 UT App 30, iJ16, 37, 50 and 56 and nn. 12, 15
and 19. As this Court acknowledged in State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 70, D.B. is
properly read as an example of the Court's utilizing the exceptional circumstances
doctrine to avert manifest injustice to remedy an error that arose in the lower court's
final judgment, a rare procedural anomaly wherein D.B. had no opportunity to object
and preserve his claim in the lower court. Id. at if 34. D.B. and the cases cited
therein hold that a party is not fairly expected to have objected to legal errors that
arose when the party had no opportunity to object. See D.B., 2012 UT 65 at~ 17
and n.2 (discussing exceptional circumstances doctrine) and at ~134-35 (holding
juvenile was not required to preserve claim of error in court's imposition of
accomplice liability because juvenile had no notice or opportunity to object to the
error that arose for the first time in court's final order; citing similar cases).
The rationale of D.B. applies here, as the court of appeals correctly found that
Cooper was not aware of the judge's marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy until
after Cooper was bound over to district court (R. 428, 657, 659-662). Compare D.B.
Guvenile was not aware of objectionable ruling until weeks after it issued). Cooper's
learning of the issue when it was too late to object constitutes a rare procedural

5
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anomaly that justifies relieving him of the preservation requirement, particularly given
the manifest injustice that othenvise would result, and significant constitutional rights
and liberty interest at stake. 2 See Johnson,~ 37 (exceptional circumstances doctrine
allows courts to relieve parties of preservation requirement to avert manifest injustice,
protect constitutional rights and liberty interests, and se1-ve interests in judicial
economy when rare procedural anomalies arise).

2.

The Record Shows the Juvenile Judge and Juvenile
Defense Counsel Were Not Acquainted.

In discussing the preservation issue, the State asserts its factually erroneous
and oft-repeated claim that the juvenile court may have known that Cooper's juvenile
court counsel knew of her marriage to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of
the Weber County Attorney's Office, thus alleviating the duty to disclose. State's
briefat2,12, 15,21,24,3~31,32,35,36.
The judge had no reason to know that Cooper's juvenile court counsel was
aware of her marriage, as the judge and Cooper's lawyer were not acquainted.
Juvenile counsel Rex Bray entered his appearance in the Weber County Juvenile

2A

child's liberty interest is at stake in proceedings designed to move the child
from the juvenile to the adult system. State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ~ 15, 245 P.3d
7 45. Given that children prosecuted in adult court may be housed and endangered in
adult facilities, life may also be at stake. See,~' Katz Levi, "State v. Mohl: State
Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 17 4-76 and
accompanying notes (2007) (explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails
endangers children, and increases the risk of suicide).
The se1-vice of an impartial and competent judge is required by Due Process
Clause of the federal constitution and Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Caperton v. A.C. Massey, Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Arizona v. Fulrninante, 499 U.S.
279, 309-310 (1991); Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945).
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Court in Ogden, listing his Sandy office address, on November 13, 2013. The first
time he appeared before the juvenile court, when he told the judge his name, she
responded, "I'm son-y?" and then he restated his name and spelled his last name for
her and then she thanked him (T. 11/19/13: 2). When they were scheduling
prelirri.inary hearing, Mr. Bray informed the court he was coming from Draper in Salt
Lake County (f. 11/19/13: 8). When the court asked Mr. Bray his position on
detention, she did not address him by name, but addressed him, "Sir- Counsel'' (f.
11/19/13: 10). :rvlr. Bray did not attend the four detention hearings that followed the
November 19 hearing before the preliminary hearing (T. 11/25/13; 12/2/13;
12/9/13; 12/10/13). At preliminary hearing, the court accidentally addressed Mr.

Bray as Mr. Van Huizen (PH 118). This record disposes of the State's repeated
assertions that the judge may have had no duty to disclose her marriage as she had
reason to lmow that Cooper's counsel was aware of the marriage.
The State incorrectly asserts the court of appeals "surmised the juvenile court
likely presumed that Defendant's counsel was aware of the relationship." State's brief
at 10. Van Huizen indicates the juvenile court judge may have assumed counsel's
awareness but could not legally have rested on this assumption, as it was Cooper's
decision whether to assert the disqualification issue. Id. at il3 7 n.11.

3.

Cooper Is Not Bound by his Attorney's Unknowing
Purported Waiver.

The State incorrectly contends that Cooper should be bound on a theory of
agency by his la,vyer's failure to raise the disqualification issue. State's brief at 21.
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No agency theory would apply in this criminal case wherein it would have been
ineffective assistance of counsel had counsel knowingly forfeited Cooper's right to
move for disqualification. Cf.,~' Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,

,r 77, 150 P.3d

480 (finding agency theoty does not apply when an attorney in a capital postconviction case commits ineffective assistance of counsel). A criminal defense
attorney's forfeiture of a client's rights is not properly treated as a knowing and
intelligent or constitutionally valid waiver of the rights by the client. See,~ State v.
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ,r 31, 137 P.3d 716.
The State notes that Elizabeth Hunt did not raise a claim of ineffective
assistance against Mr. Bray for not moving to disqualify the judge, State's brief at 18
n.3. As Mr. Bray was not acquainted with the judge and the judge did not disclose
her marriage(~ T. 11/19/13: 2, PH 118), there is no factual basis for such a claim.
B.

VAN HUIZEN SQUARES WITH THIS COURT'S
PRECEDENTS ON PREJUDICE.

1.

The State's Factual Positions are Incorrect.

The State's argument as to the ~applicability of Reichert hinges on its
factually incorrect positions that the juvenile judge may have had reason to believe
that Cooper's juvenile court counsel was aware of her marriage to the Chief Criminal
Deputy, alleviating the need to disclose the disqualifying facts, and that the judge's

•

husband was screened from participation in Cooper's case. State's brief at 35-37. The
judge had no reason to think Cooper's lawyer knew of her marriage; the lawyer and
judge were not acquainted (T. 11/19/13: 2-10).

8
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•

The record shows the Chief Criminal Deputy was acting as a lawyer on the
case at least in the adult court proceedings (R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14, R..
523). The Chief Criminal Deputy contacted Elizabeth Hunt to address Cooper's case
on Weber County Attorney Dee Smith's behalf on May 19> 2014> after Hunt began
contacting Mr. Smith and the juvenile court prosecutor Brody Flint in efforts to settle
the case and obtain discovery (R. 523).
Page 8 of the district court docket also shows on May 21, 2015, the Chief
Deputy ordered recordings of the hearings on March 19, 2014 and May 7, 2014 (R.
635, docket entries on 5/21/14). 3 The State argues incorrectly that the Chief Deputy
requested the copies of the proceedings only in response to Hunt's document
requests, State's brief at 13, 24, and 26. Hunt had the hearings transcribed by May 18,
2014, three days before the Chief Deputy ordered the recordings on May 21, 2014,
and cited the transcripts in her memoranda filed on May 19, 2014. See R. 627
(reporter's certificate for two transcripts); R. 82-92, 102-112 (memoranda citing
transcripts). Contra1-y to page 26 of the State's brief> when Hunt asserted in the
opening brief in the court of appeals that the judge's husband ordered portions of the

3

The court of appeals erroneously indicated it was the same day the juvenile
judge signed the bindover order that the Chief Deputy ordered digital copies of
proceedings. Van Huizen, ,I 37. The record shows the judge signed the bindover
order roughly four months before the Chief Deputy ordered recordings (R. 28-31, R.
635, docket entries on 5/21/14). The State emphasizes this error, State's brief at 14,
26, but does establish its materiality. Regardless of when the Chief Deputy ordered
the records, and particularly because he was the attorney who first contacted Hunt on
behalf of the Weber County Attorney (R. 523), his involvement confirms he was an
attorney working on and in the chain of command in Cooper's case, who was not
screened from his wife's cases. Van Huizen, if 40.
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record after Hunt began challenging Cooper's convictions, Hunt described the order
of events and did not concede that the judge's husband ordered the records in
response to her request.
'I'he assertion in the record that the Chief Deputy had no supervisory role or
involvement in the juvenile court portion of the case, State's brief at 8-9, 11, 16, 2425, 29, is not "evidence" as the State claims on page 25 of its brief. It appears in an
unsworn argument of the juvenile court prosecutor (R. 505) that was unsupported by
a declaration, even after the absence of supporting evidence was raised (R. 515).
The record disproves the State's assorted positions that the record shows that
the Chief Deputy was mostly likely screened from this case, most likely would not
have been involved in this case, was not involved in the case, and had nothing to do
with this case, State's brief at 2, 11, 12-13, 22, 24, 27, 29, 30, and 36.

2.

Van Huizen Properly Applies Reichert, which Should Not Be
Overruled.

The State contends that under Van Huizen and Reichert, litigants will be
encow:aged to take unfair advantage on appeal by sitting silent when their cases are
presided over by unqualified judges. State's brief at 15-17, 33, 38-40. Reichert

•

remains controlling, as the State does not ask the Court to overrule it, cf. ~ 11AA
Prospector v. Fahner, 2017 UT 68, ,I~ 18-19, _

P.3d _

(declining to revisit

precedent left unaddressed by party who did not ask for overruling), or carry the
heavy burden to justify overruling this precedent,~ State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
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•

398 (Utah 1994) (under stare decfris, this Court has authority to overrule its precedents
if the Court is clearly convinced the precedent was erroneous when decided).
The State's concern is inapposite to both cases, as Cooper and Mr. Reichert
were not aware of the disqualifying facts in time to move for disqualification or make
a reek.less and expensive tactical decision to proceed with an ostensibly partial judge
to plant error for appeal. No party can take unfair advantage of an error they do not
know about, particularly if judges do their duties to disclose disqualifying facts and/ or
recuse themselves. Reichert and Van Huizen correctly apply well-established Utah
law requiring our judges, rather than unknowing litigants or their counsel, to
scrupulously protect the appearance of our justice system by passing on the cases
wherein their impartiality is reasonably subject to question. E.g.. State v. Neeley, 748
P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988)("a judge should recuse himself when his "impartiality"
might reasonably be questioned .... the integrity of the judicial system should be
protected against any taint of suspicion.))), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1220 (1988).
The State seeks to distinguish Reichert, because it only remanded for reargument before a different panel of the court of appeals, whereas Van Huizen
purportedly undoes an entire criminal prosecution. State's brief at 37. Van Huizen
ordered a new SYO preliminary hearing. If Cooper does not prevail, his pleas,
convictions and sentence in adult court stand. Van Huizen at 1 65. Regardless of
whether he prevails, he has served his entire prison sentence. Id. at ii 9.
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•
The State observes that a court's violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
does not justify reversal of a criminal conviction, particularly when the record shows
the defendant was not prejudiced. State's brief at 40-41.
Van Huizen recognizes that a judge's violation of disqualification law does not
necessarily justify a new trial. Id. at 1151. As the court first reasoned, the line of
disqualification cases requiring proof of prejudice are appeals imposing this burden
after Utah R. Crim. P. 29 procedures in the trial courts, wherein known causes for
disqualification are presumably adjudicated properly by original judges and then

•

further vetted by neutral reviewing district judges before appeal. See id. at ,r~ 51-56,
discussing Neeley; Alonzo; and State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989). The
court of appeals' reasoning is entirely consistent with Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979, and

•

Neeley, 948 P.2d at 1094-95, wherein this CoU11 held that once rule 29 procedures
have occurred, the burden shifts to the defend ant to prove prejudice.
The Van Huizen court contrasted the Rule 29 cases with Reichert, wherein
this Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals without a showing of
prejudice, as a result of an undisclosed and disqualifying relationship between a court
of appeals judge and two attomeys not involved in the appeal, who were working for
the firm involved in the appeal and related to the judge by marriage. The Van Huizen
court reasoned that in Reichert and Van Huizen, it was proper to abstain from
requiring proof of prejudice, because the disqualifying facts came to light after rule 29
disqualification procedures were available, and thus, there was no layered district
court consideration of the need for disqualification by the original and reviewing
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•

judges prior to appeal, as is normally provided in Rule 29 proceedings. Van Huizen
at ,1,r 52-56, 58-59. The State does not address or dispute this reasoning.
The Van Huizen court next correctly reasoned that prejudice must be shown
for failure to disqualify in cases such as Alonzo, Neeley and Gardner, wherein the
rule 29 procedures occurred and the ultimate decision was made by jurors, who
insulated the ultimate result from the apparent bias of the judges. See, id. at ~1 5758. In cases such as Reichert and Van Huizen, there was no independent decisionmaker to insulate the ultimate result from the courts' apparent bias. Id. at ~157-59.
Similar to the judge in Reichert who participated in the ultimate decision of the court
of appeals, Cooper's juvenile court judge made an independent factual and legal
inquity that resulted in the dispositive order sending Cooper from the protections of
the juvenile court and into the adult system. Van Huizen at 158. As there was only
one decision maker, and her husband was not screened from but was involved in this
case at least following the bindover, the 11.sk of effect from the disqualifying facts was
greater than in Reichert, where only one judge on a thtee judge panel was related by
marriage to attorneys who were not involved in the appeal but were part of a firm
involved in the appeal.
The State contends incorrectly that Van H uizen reversed the bindover order
despite finding the failure to recuse harmless, State's brief at 16. Van Huizen
distinquished the cases such as Gardner finding judicial disqualification errors
harmless. Van Huizen, i[sl. Van Huizen abstained from conducting a harmless
error analysis, because there was no Rule 29 vetting process, given the highly
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discretionary and fact intensive nature of the bindover decision made solely by the
juvenile court judge, and in light of the absence of a jury to insulate the case from the
effects of the apparent bias of the decision-maker. See id. ,r,r 52-62.
Because Van Huizen squares with this Court's precedents on judicial
disqualification and prejudice, the Court should aff11m it.

C.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS, OR SHOULD
REJECT THE STATE'S CHALLENGES TO THE
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE OF THE NEED FOR THE JUDGE
TO DISCLOSE THE MARRIAGE OR RECUSE HERSELF.
1.

The State's Arguments Exceed the Grant of Certiorari
and Misstate the Court of Appeals' Decision.

In addressing the preservation issue, the State argues as if Van Huizen
justified its preservation analysis with its substantive ruling that Rule 2.11 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Conduct required the judge to disclose her marriage or recuse
herself, given her husband's involvement in the case. The State then argues that the
judge was not plainly required ·to disclose the marriage or recuse, as the record does
not t.1.1..ily show that the judge's husband was involved in Cooper's case. State's brief
at 20, 22-30 citing,I,I 37, 48, 50 and n.15 of Van Huizen.
T'he Van Huizen court's preservation analysis appears in one footnote and
does not encompass the substantive issue of whether the judge had a duty to recuse
or disclose her marriage under Rule 2.11. Van H uizen, ,I 50 n.15.
This Court's order granting certiorari does not allow for this issue to be raised

by tl~e State. See Court's Order granting certiorari dated 7 /5/17, in the addendum.
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This Court should protect its authority to select issues for certiorari review and
disallow efforts to usurp it in violation of the rules of appellate procedure requiring
parties to petition for permission to raise issues on certiorari,~, Utah R. App. P.
45-49. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995)(rejecting petitioner's

claim outside grant of certiorari).
While he maintains the Court should not address the State's unpe1mitted
arguments, out of an abundance of caution, Cooper responds.
2.

The State's Arguments Ar.e Factually and Legally
Incorrect.

The State repeatedly argues that the court of appeals acted contrarily to the
record and on the unfounded the assumption that the juvenile judge's husband was
involved in and in the chain of command in this case. State's brief at 2, 11, 12-13, 22,
24, 27, 29, 30, 36. The court actually recognized that the Chief Deputy gaye at least
some assistance to the juvenile court prosecutor. Id.- at ,r,r 9, 37, 40. As detailed
above, the judge's husband did participate in Cooper's case at least in adult court (R.
523, R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14).
The State argues that the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of the Weber
County Attorney's Office was not "an officer, director, general partner, managing
member, or trustee of a party" because he has no financial interest in the success of
the Weber County Attorney's Office. State's brief at 27. Assuming the relevance of
his financial interests, the Chief Deputy's position and employment were ostensibly
contingent on the effectiveness of his work as the Chief Deputy.
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Of greater importance, the focus of Rule 2.11 is not on the interests of the
people to whom the judge is tied, it is on the appearance of our judicial system. The
judge's husband, as the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division, ostensibly to the
public was an officer, manager or director in a powerful position over any criminal
case prosecuted by the Weber County Attorney's Office, and the public court record

•

shows his involvement in the case (R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14). The judge
presiding over a juvenile case wherein the Weber County Attorney's Office's goal was
to move the juvenile to the adult system for adult prosecution and incarceration, who
was married to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division, who was not screened
from her cases, should have passed the case to another judge, to protect public
confidence in the fairness of these important procee~gs. See Rule 2.11 and
commentaiJ. The Chief Deputy's titled position falls within the plain language of
(A)(2)(a). 4 The judge's husband's position as the Chief Deputy of the Criminal
Division is at least sufficiently analogous to the listed examples to require recusal
under the non-exclusive language of 2.11, as the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned by virtue of her marriage to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division.
Contrary to page 29 of the State's brief, the record shows that the judge's

4

The Van Huizen com-t correctly noted that the term officer applies to
government employees, but was uncertain as to its application because of uncertainty
of whether the Chief Deputy was elected or appointed. Id. at iJ 25-26. The code
indicates that deputy attorneys are employed or deputized by county attorneys, Utah
Code Ann. § 17-18a-602, and makes no mention of electing deputies. As the rule
does not distinguish between elected and appointed officers, and the goal is to
protect the appearance of our justice system, judges are properly encouraged to
recuse if they have qualifying relationships to people in specified or similar positions.
16
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•

•
husband had more than a de miminis interest in the case. 5 He \Vas one of the
prosecuting party's lawyers and acting as a lawyer in this case at least after his wife
issued the bindover order and after Cooper began challenging his convictions and
sentences (R.. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14, R. 523). This required recusal or
disclosure under 2.11(A), (A)(1), (A)(2)(b) and (A)(2)(c). See Van Huizen at ii 27
(recognizing rule 2.11(A)(2)(b) and (c) seem applicable).

•

The State's argument that the judge's husband was not a party to the proceeding
under (A)(2)(a) of Rule 2.11, State's brief at 27, is not explained. This Court should
not address it. State v. Nelson, 355 P.3d 1031, i[40, 2015 UT 62 (declining to address
inadequately briefed issue).
This Court should leave undisturbed Van Huizen's holdings that reversal of
the bindover order is required under Rules 1.2 and 2.11 as a result of the judge's
man-iage to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division, which gave rise to a
reasonable question of partiality, and the court's unfulfilled duty to disclose the facts
or self-recuse.

II.

5

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE SERIOUS
YOUTH OFFENDER PRELIMINARY HEARING

The terminology definition in the Code of Judicial Conduct reflects:
"De minimis," in the context of interests pertaining to disqualification of a
judge, means an insignificant interest that could not raise a reasonable
question regarding the judge's impartiality. See Rule 2.11.
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The right to effective assistance of counsel applies when children are being
prosecuted in SYO preliminary bearings, wherein they arc at risk of being transferred
to the adult system. ~ , Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, il~ 38-40, 197 P.3d 636.
To establish ineffective assistance, Cooper must specify acts or omissions that were
objectively unreasonable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984).
He must overcome the presumption that counsel's strategies were "within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.n Stricldand, 466 U.S. at 689. Thorough
investigation of the facts and law are prerequisite to fo1mulatio11 of sound strategy,
and essential to a constitutionally adequate defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State
v. J.A.L., 2011 UT 27, il 27, 262 P .3d 1. Trial lawyers must properly presetve all
issues. See,~ State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at iJ 10, 67 P.3d 1005. When
counsel fail to assert beneficial, current law, this objectively deficient performance
will not be excused with hypothetical tactical reasons. See, State v. Moritzsky. 771
P.2d 688,692 (Utah App. 1989). To show prejudice, Cooper must show with less
than a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable probability of a more favorable
result absent the objectively deficient performance. Strickland at 694.

A.

COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO
INFORM THE COURT ABOUT THE 2013
AMENDMENTS TO THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER
STATUTE.

Stricldand puts the burden squarely on the shoulders of defense counsel to
fully investigate and assert the law governing at the time of Cooper's SYO
preliminaty hearing. Id. at 690. During Cooper's SYO preliminary hearing on
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December 20, 2013, no one mentioned the amendments to the Serious Youth
Offender Act that went into effect on May 14, 2013. Prior to the amendments in
May of 2013, our juvenile courts had very little discretion to retain minors under the
SYO statute. Juveniles bore a "heavy burden" to overcome the presumption that
they would transfer to the adult court, and had to show by clear and convincing
evidence all of the retention factors: that they were less culpable than co-perpetrators,
that their role in the offense was not violent, aggressive or premeditated, and that
they had no prior delinquency involving a weapon that would have been a felony
offense if an adult had committed it. E.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c)

•

(2012); State v. F.L.R., 2006 UT App 294, ifiJ3 and 4, 141 P.3d 601. The rationale
behind the pre-2013 version of the SYO statute was that public safety was served by
sending young offenders into the adult system, despite the fact that juveniles might

•

benefit from the rehabilitative services of the juvenile court. M.E.P. v. State, 2005
UT App 227,

if 14 n. 4, 114 P.3d 596; State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098-99

(Utah App. 1997). Under the pre-2013 version of the SYO statute, courts were not
to consider whether juveniles were amenable to rehabilitation. See A.B., supra, at
1098.
Under the 2013 amended statute, juvenile courts obtained discretion to retain
juveniles based on an ultimate assessment of the juveniles' and the public's interest in
the juveniles' remaining in juvenile court. Under the 2013 statute, juveniles no longer
bear the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the subsidiary
considerations -- that they had no prior weapons-related adjudications, that their
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relative culpability was lower than their co-perpetrators, and that their roles in the
offenses were not violent, premeditated and aggressive. Rather, these factors are

•

considered to the degree they may be present, along with the juveniles' prior history
or lack thereof in the juvenile courts, and whether retaining them in juvenile court
better serves the public safety interest than sending them into the adult system. See

•

78A-6-702(3) (2013). Considerations such as the juveniles' amenability to treatment,
risk of re-offense, and availability of developmentally appropriate treatment in the
juvenile system are now subject to consideration under the 2013 amended statute,
which factors in whether the public's interest in safety and general interests and the
minor's interests are best set-ved by retaining the minors in juvenile court. See Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c)(v) (2013).
The 2013 SYO statute added the requirement of ultimate weighing of whether
sending the juvenile into the adult system would be contrary to the public interest in
general the juvenile's interest in general, Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(b), and
added in the list of subsidiary considerations the question of whether the public
safety interest is better served by keeping juveniles in juvenile court or sending
juveniles into the adult system, and the nature and number of the defendant's prior
juvenile court adjudications. § 78A-6-702(3)(c)Qv) and (v).
Under standard rules of statutory construction, statutory amendments are
presumed to alter existing legal rights or to clarify previous legislative intentions.
E.g., Hercules Inc. v. State Tax Cornm'n., 2000 UT App 372, if 13, 21 P.3d 231. The
2013 statutoty amendments, requiring retention analysis to weigh the public interest
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•

and the juvenile's .interest in retention and to consider the public safety interest,
require a full inquiry into the juveniles' risk of re-offense and amenability to
rehabilitation in the juvenile system. This is consistent with our constitutional law
requiring the important decision of transferring a juvenile to the adult system to be
premised on a thorough investigation, made in compliance with statutory directives,
and sufficiently detailed to ensure thorough appellate review. E.g., State in re
Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1985); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
553 (1966).
Assuming the statutory amendments were less than clear, our law recognizes
when the plain language of statutes does not clearly reflect what the legislature
intended, it is appropriate explore legislative history to clarify legislative intent. See,
~

Sullivan v. Scouler Grain Company of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993),

superseded by statute on other ~ounds, Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ~ 12,
48 P.3d 218. The legislative history behind the 2013 amendments to the SYO Act
confirms the amendments were designed to serve the interests of the public and
juveniles in reducing recidivism by having juveniles who are amenable to reform,
particularly first time offenders such as Cooper, utilize the resources in the juvenile
system, rather than enter tl1e adult system. Given tl1e language of the statuto1-y
amendments and essential legislative history,~ Sullivan, full inquiry into Cooper's
amenability to treatment and low risk of re-offense was essential under the 2013
amendments.
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The rationale for the amendments is found in the legislative history for House
Bill 105 from the 2013 general session that reflects the SYO statute was amended to

•

increase the discretion of juvenile court judges to retain juveniles, and to decrease the
burden of proof on juveniles in the retention phase of SYO prelimina1-y hearings, and
thereby reduce the number of juveniles who were being transferred into the adult
system without first exhausting the resources of the juvenile system, in order to serve
the best interests of both juveniles and the public. See
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id=2796&meta id=76536

•

, (testimony of Jacey Skinner, Director of the Utah Sentencing Commission, before
the House Standing Judiciary on February 22, 2013;
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?dip id=2864&meta id=78203
(floor debate commentai-y by bill sponsor, Representative Low1-y Snow); and
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id=3146&meta id=85441
(floor debate commentary by Senator Lyle Hillyard), transcribed in the addendum.
The amendments were made to account for the fact that juveniles who are sent into
the adult system are frequently released from adult confinement relatively quickly
without rehabilitative inte1-vention and resources, and tend to recidivate more
frequently and more violently tl1an those retained in the juvenile system. Thus,
contrary to prior thought, public safety interests coincide with the juveniles' interests

•
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•

in juveniles staying in juvenile courts, where they have the benefits of rehabilitative
services. See id. 6
As is detailed herein, counsel's failure to inform the court of the amended law
was prejudicial for under the 2013 amendments, Cooper should have remained in
juvenile court.

B.

COUNSEL VJ/AS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO
PREPARE AND PRESENT THE RETENTION CASE.

In Houskeeper, supra, the Court held that counsel was objectively deficient in
failing to investigate and present expert testimony to the effect that the aggravated
sexual assault bound over from the preliminaty hearing was not violent or aggressive,
id, and that Houskeeper was prejudiced by this, given that the jll11 who heard the
appropriate expert testimony at ttial convicted him only of attempted rape. Id. at ,i,r
6

Multiple studies document that transferring juveniles into the adult system
disserves the interests of the public in safety and the interests of the minors, for in
the adult system, minors do not receive the benefits of the age-appropriate
rehabilitative set-vices available in juvenile court, and are often released early without
effective intei-vention. This phenomenon, coupled with the housing of
impressionable and developing minors with adult offenders, and the stigmatizing
effect of adult prosecution, results in increased recidivism, particularly violent
recidivism, among juvenile offenders in the adult system, as compared to those who
remain in the juvenile system. See, ~ 11] uvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective
Deterrent to Delinquency" by Richard Redding in the OJJDP bulletin (2008)
(bttps://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1 /ojjdp/220595.pdf); "Different from Adults: An
Updated Analysis of Juvenile Transfer and Blended Sentencing Law, With
Recommendations for Reform 11 by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (Nov
2008) (http://www.ncjj.org/PDF /MFC/MFC Transfer 2008.pdf); "Transfer of
Juveniles to Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court11 by Edward Mulvey
and Carol Schubert, OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin December 2012
(httJ_J://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/232932.pdf); and "The Effectiveness of Declining
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,>' Washington State Institute for Public Policy, December
2013.
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41-51. The Court found prejudice even though Houskeeper did not challenge the
fairness of the trial he had in adult court, wherein he was convicted of a lesser offense
for which he may have been found delinquent in juvenile court. In finding prejudice,
the Court recognized that the juvenile-court adjudications would have been subject to
expungement, whereas the adult conviction was not, and that in the juvenile system,

•

Houskeeper's best interests would have been the focus of the proceedings, and he
would have been eligible for the rehabilitative services. Id.
Cooper's counsel similarly failed to prepare his retention case in the SYO

•

proceedings, and prejudiced Cooper in the same manner with this objectively
deficient performance. Under the 2013 amended statute, the retention inquiry was
defined by § 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c). The overarching considerations of the interest
of the minor and the public were informed by consideration of
(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if
committed by an adult;
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons,
whether the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability
than the codefendants;
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed
in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner;
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the
juvenile court; and
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in
the juvenile court or in the district court.
Id.
1.

•

Absence Of Qualifying Weapons Related History And
Complete Absence of Prior History

Cooper had no prior weapons-related offenses. He no prior adjudications in
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the juvenile court. Counsel failed to argue that these separate statutory factors
weighed separately and heavily in favor of retention (PH 119).

2.

Relative Culpability

Counsel did not assert the law in effect at the time recognizing that the court
should compare the behavior of the crime participants, and should not attribute the
misconduct of others to Cooper in the relative culpability analysis (PH 119-120).
Compare State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,I 28, 79 P.3d 951;7 with M.E.P. v. State,

7

In Lara, the court reversed the juvenile court's application of the statute in
finding that Lara had acted in a violent and aggressive way, because instead of
focusing on Lara's actual individual role, the court "focused on the actions of the
other participants." ,128. The court recognized that all offenses eligible for
prosecution under the SYO statute are by nature violent, and that if a transfer order
could be premised on the violent nature of the offenses charged, rather than on the
basis of a comparison of the juvenile's behavior vis-a-vis his co-perpetrators, all SYO
defendants would be transferred to the adult court. Id. at~ 29. The court also
reversed the juvenile court's reasoning that Lara was equally culpable with his coperpetrators unless he could show no involvement in the crime. Id. at ,I 29. The
court explained that if the juvenile were not involved in the crime, he would not have
been charged, and that "the relevant inquiry is whether the juvenile is less
blameworthy than the codefendants because he was not the initiator or driving force
behind the crime, did not use a weapon or threaten the victim, or otherwise played a
less active role in the crime." Id. Because Lara had stayed in the back seat of the car
while his co-perpetrators perpetrated the robbe1y and assault, and only drove the
victim's car away, the court found that he had carried his burden to show that his role
in the offense involved less culpability than that of ~s co-perpetrators. Id. The court
noted that the State had presented no form of conspiracy or aiding such as
encouragement. Id. at ,130.
As to premeditation, the court found that Lara's participation was incidental,
not premeditated, because the co-perpetrators approached the victim, robbed her of
her keys at gunpoint, had her kneel outside her car, looked in the car and then went
and talked to Lara and gave him gave the keys, before Lara walked from the car he
was in and got in the victim's truck and drove away, stopping to pick up a coperpetrator. Id. at ,ii 32-33. The court ruled that the facts showed that the other
robbers decided that Lara would drive the stolen truck when they realized it had a
standard transmission they could not drive, and that his role in the aggravated
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2005 UT App 227, 114 P.3d 596;8 and State v. F.L.R., 2006 UT App 294, 141 P.3d
601. 9 This was hugely prejudicial because Cooper's relative culpability was by far the
least of the participants', and the court attributed their misconduct to Cooper. See
Point III, i1!fra.
Cooper was the youngest and second smallest of the defendants, 10 the oldest

robbery was spontaneous, not premeditated. Id. The State petitioned for review of
the reinstatement of the appeal on certiorari, and this Court affumed the court of
appeals' opinion. State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 124 P .3d 243.
8

M.E.P. affirmed the juvenile court's finding that regardless of the fact that
the defendant's conduct occurred during horseplay, it was nonetheless violent or
aggressive. The defendant was playing with friends who were hitting one another
with a computer pad. He grabbed a gun, checked to see that it was not loaded, and
then pointed it at and shot his friend, causing serious bodily injury. The Court found
M.E.P.'s conduct more akin to that in State ex rel Z.R.S., 951 P.2d 1114 (Utah App.
1998), wherein a juvenile's bindover order was affirmed because the defendant forced
his way into a home with a large knife in his possession, and put his hand on the
thigh of the eleven year old girl who was home and who felt threatened by this. The
court found that M.E.P.'s conduct less like that in State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, 79
P.3d 951, wherein the defendant's liability for an aggravated robbery arose when he
drove a stolen car away from the victim after his two friends had removed the victim
from the car at gunpoint, explaining, he "did not wi~ld a gun or approach the victim."
"His liability for the crime was purely as an accomplice. See id. Therefore, we
determined that his role in the offense 'was neither violent nor aggressive."' M.E.P.
at, 17. "In Lara, the juvenile was quite removed from the violence and aggression of
the underlying offense to which he was an accomplice, and thus his role was not
violent or aggressive." M.E.P. at, 19.
F.L.R.. affirmed juvenile court findings that the juvenile failed to show the
requisite lack of violence and aggression, because the juvenile had a gun in his pocket
and conducted a robbery by telling the victim he was armed, being in close proximity
to her, blocking her from getting in her car, and taking her property. The court
compared the facts of F.L.R. to those in Lara, wherein Lara sat in the car while his
co-perpetrators committed the armed robbe1-y, and only drove the stolen car away.
F.L.R., ~7.
9

10

Cooper was 16 years 4 months old, 5'11" tall and weighed 150 pounds (R. 160).
Wesley Brown was 18 years 10 months old, 6'2" tall, and weighed 217 pounds (R.
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of whom, Wesley Brown and Dexter Skinner, had multiple felony cases pending (~
R. 167-69; R. 170-72). Skinner had schemed by text messages with Joshua Dutson
the day before the robbery to "grab them straps" (Cooper's father's guns) and rob
some people, while, in a separate text message conversation wherein Joshua claimed
to be "high" and appeared to be joking, Joshua invited Cooper to rob some people

(R. 295-96, 450). The next day, after Cooper was driven to Skinner by Tomek
Perkins and did not bring the guns, Skinner and the others took Cooper back to his
father's house to retrieve the guns and commit the robbery that Wesley had planned

(R. 295-96, 450). Christian Davidson identified Skinner as the person who had his
gun out by his side when the robbers forced their way into the home, and who
threatened to pop a cap (shoot him) if Christian did not let them in (R. 247-49, 251
253, 260, 261). During the robbery that followed the amicable conversation in the
basement about Dexter's or Wesley's gun supposedly having bodies on it (people
who had been killed buy it), Christian said that Dexter was the first one to point his
gun at Christian and demand his property, and also demanded the other bag of
marijuana Skinner had seen Christian put in his pocket before the robbery began (R.

248, 251-52). Skinner demanded Christian's money and directed one of his cohorts
to take Davidson's wallet and phone (K 254). Inasmuch as Christian originally
indicated during the photo array that it was the third gunman who took his wallet and
phone (R. 310), and then was unsure that Cooper was this person (R. 257), it appears
165-66). Dexter Skinner was 18 years 4 months old, 6' tall, and weighed 185 pounds
(R. 163-64). Tomek Perkins was 18 years 9 months eighteen years old, 5'6" tall, and
weighed 120 pounds R. 162). Joshua Dutson was 17 years 2 months old, 6' tall, and
weighed 160 pounds (R. 161).
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that Joshua Dutson, who admitted to being the third gunman (R.. 284, 289), was the
person who took Christian's wallet and phone.
Wesley Brown had previously lived in the· home where the robbety occurred,
knew there would be drugs there, and planned the robbery (R. 248-49). He pulled a
gun during the robbe11' and pointed it at Christian Davidson while discussing
Brown's displeasure at Davidson's having awakened him with a pipe in a past
incident (R. 255). Wesley went upstairs to pay an anned visit to Davidson's mother,
who had previously taken Wesley in until he bragged of killing a man in Louisiana
and she asked him to leave (R. 17 4, 282-83, 294).
Tomek Perkins provided the real-looking airsoft gun used by Joshua during
the robbery (R. 301-02). He brought Cooper to Skinner's house the morning of the
robbery, drove everyone to Cooper's to retrieve his father's guns, and was the
getaway driver for the robbery (R. 283, 288).
Joshua Dutson was a juvenile whose phone records documented his dealing
and using illegal drugs with multiple people (R. 267, 329-337). The day before the
robbery, when Cooper texted him and asked him to "chill," Joshua suggested they go
to Dexter's and smoke marijuana (R. 445-47). While claiming to be high,Joshua
invited Cooper to participate in robbing people as if it were a joke, while
simultaneously scheming with Dexter Skinner in a separate text message conversation
about inviting Cooper to participate in robbing people, grabbing «them straps"
(Cooper's father's guns), and robbing people the next day (R.. 295-96, 450). Joshua
pulled and held the real-looking airsoft gun pointed at the ground during the robbei-y
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(R. 247).
Cooper was present and passive during the robbery; two of the three guns
were retrieved from Cooper's father's house; none of the guns was loaded and one
was broken (R.. 284, 296). Cooper initially agreed to participate in robbing
unspecified people during the text conversation the day before (R. 447-449), but the
actual robbery was planned the next day by Wesley Brown, who knew Davidson
would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306). Cooper did not know Wesley or Tomek or
Davidson before the day of the robbery (R. 293). As is detailed herein, the juvenile
court held Cooper accountable for the other participants' criminal conduct in what
should have been the relative culpability analysis.
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated the ages of the codefendants and
argued that they were all of similar age and experience, and were operating as a peer
group, rather than as adults influencing the younger codefendants (R. 363). Counsel
for Cooper presented no evidence and little argument that Cooper was the youngest
defendant, smaller than all but one other defendant, and had no criminal history, in
contrast to his codefendants, who were all older, all but one of whom were larger (R..
160-66), and the oldest two of whom, Wesley Brown and Dexter Skinner, had

multiple felony cases pending (R. 161-73) (PH 120). When the detective testified
about Cooper's interrogation and told the judge that Cooper initially omitted Wesley
Brown from his description of the robbery but later agreed to tell the truth (R. 29293), counsel failed to cross-examine the officer about the key missing fact: Cooper
wanted police protection before he was willing to acknowledge Wesley Brown's
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participation (R. 427). The uni:efuted misimpressions left by the prosecutor's
argument and evidence were that Cooper was operating with co-equal peers and was
not influenced by anyone as they were all the same age (R. 363), and that Cooper was
protecting Wesley Brown (R. 292-93).
Trial counsel performed objectively deficiently in failing to show that Cooper
was relatively less culpable and susceptible to the older, larger and more sophisticated
defendants, who were not present for the juvenile court to see. The evidence was
important to show that Cooper qualified for retention in the juvenile court under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702(3)(ii). The evidence also aids in understanding
Cooper's role in the offense as a manipulated pawn of the older, larger, more
sophisticated, codefendants, and that Cooper thus qualified for retention in the
juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702(3)(iii). Cooper's relative
vulnerability and lack of sophistication and criminality vis-a-vis his codefendants also
infonns the relatively lesser public safety risks Cooper poses, and his and the public's
general interest in his remaining in juvenile court, see U tab Code Ann. § 78A-6702(3)(b) and (c)(v).
Counsel presented no law or evidence that children are less culpable and
deserve greater leniency, because their brains are biologically underdeveloped and do
not function well when it comes to making decisions and gauging the impact of their
actions. 11 Nor did counsel inform the court through expert testimony or other means

11

Scientific and sociological studies demonstrate that the brains of adolescent
children are not yet fully developed, particularly in the frontal lobes, which control
decision-making. E.g. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Children have an
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as to the deleterious effects of marijuana on adolescent brains, 12 and as to how use of
marijuana harms the portions of the brain are essential to decision-making.13
3.

Violent, Aggressive or Premeditated Role

Counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the court that Cooper's role in the
offense should focus on his behavior. See Lara, supra (requiring courts to distinguish
and focus on role of the individual juvenile in assessing retention factors). As
underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack maturity, and thus often take
impetuous and reckless actions and make decisions without thorough consideration.
Roper at 569. Adolescents are less likely to restrain their impulses, understand the
perspectives of others, and consider alternative actions. Id. Children's poor choices
and actions are influenced by their impressionable nature and their vulnerability to
peer pressure and other negative influences. Id. They have less control over their
environments, or less experience controlling their environments, than adults do, and
their character traits are also less well formed than adults'. Id. Children are more
vulnerable than adults to psychological damage. Id. at 569-70.
The biological and developmental differences in children lead to reasonable
conclusions that children's misbehaviors are especially worthy of forgiveness, and
that their characters are possible to redeem and reform. Roper at 569-70. The vast
majority of children who engage in illegal and risky behaviors as adolescents grow out
of them as they become adults. Id. Even for the most heinous of capital murders, we
recognize that children do not weigh their actions prior to taking them as adults do,
and thus their misbehavior is not as morally reprehensible. See id. See also,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837-40 (1988) (plurality); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, all to the same effect.
12

See,~ National Institute on Drug Abuse, "DrugFacts: Marijuana," found
at http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/ drugfacts/marijuana ("These effects
include altered perceptions and mood, impaired coordination, difficulty with thinking
and problem solving, and disrupted learning and memory. Marijuana also effects
brain development, and when it is used heavily by young people, its effects on
thinking and memory may last a long time or even be permanent."); Gottlieb,
"Cannabis: A Danger to the Adolescent Brain - How Pediatricians Can Address
Marijuana Use," found at http://ww\\7.mcpap.com/pdf/Cannibis.pdf.
13

E.g. http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/26886186-418/even-casualmarijuana-use-can-alter-the-brain-new-study-shows.html#.U5j8zo1dVU8.
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detailed herein, Cooper's behavior was not violent or aggressive, and was less
premeditated than the other participants'. The court's assessment of this factor
attributed the misconduct of others to Cooper, see Point III.
Counsel was objectively deficient in failing to assert ample evidence to
challenge Christian Davidson's claim that the robbery was a home invasion robbery.
Ryan Golding told the police that Davidson let the people in (R. 239), and swore that
it was after one of them was showing Ryan his gun that someone else pulled a gun
and began the robbery (R. 191). After the robbery, Golding counseled Davidson,
"Stop bringing sketchy people over to your house," (R. 185), countering that this was
a

home invasion robbery. Davidson's mother made no claim of a forced entry or

home invasion when she conveyed his allegations to the police (R. 174-78). Every
defendant who confessed to the armed robbery described the entry into the home as
consensual(~ R. 24, 27, 189, 237-38, 286).
Davidson was the only person who made claims to the effect that the robbery
began with a forced enu-y, and his claims about the supposed forced entry were
inconsistent. 14 He testified that it was only after Skinner pulled out his gun in the

In his November 8, 2013, sworn typed "Roy City Police Department
Statement of Witness," Davidson claimed that he heard the knocking, unlocked the
door, and looked out the blind to see Dexter Skinner with his gun barrel visible,
threatening to "bust a cap" if Christian did not let him in. But Christian also claimed
the door was ajar and Dexter had his foot in it, blocking Christian from closing it. R.
183-85. If the door had been ajar, there would have been no need for the Dexter to
knock or Christian to unlock the door.
In his separate handwritten sworn "Roy City Written Statemenf' from
November 4, 2013, Christian claimed that he heard a knock, looked through the
door, saw the barrel of a gun and heard a light skinned black man say, "Open the
door or I'll pop this cap." Christian said he opened the door and was told to go
14
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basement that he got very nervous and scared (R.. 252). His sworn statement to the
police describes him participating in an amicable conversation about the propriety of
touching another man's gun that occurred in the basement before the robbery began,
and acknowledges that Christian was laughing and incredulous when the robbery
began (R. 184). Counsel should have cross-examined Christian about the
inconsistencies and about how Christian's claims about the forced entry may well
have arisen from his need to engender sympathy with the police to minimize his own
cr~al jeopardy for his drug dealing and running from them when they came to
investigate the robbery (R. 180-82). He asked his mother not to report the robbery to
the police for fear that he and his friends would be investigated for involvement in
illegal drugs (R. 185). In addition to the false claim of a forced entry, Davidson told
the police his wallet contained fifty dollars (R. 185), in contrast to originally telling his
mother there was no cash in it (R. 17 4). He may have hoped to deflect blame from
himself by exaggerating his claims of victimhood. 15

·

On the premeditation factor, Ryan's Golding's version of someone pulling the
gun and initiating the robbety when Skinner was showing his gun to Ryan (R. 264-65)
downstairs. But he made no claim of trying to close the door or the man sticking his
foot in the door. R. 186-87.
In his testimony at the SYO preliminary hearing, Davidson claimed that he
opened the door after hearing a loud knock at which point Dexter Skinner was
holding a gun by his side and someone said they were coming in, and someone put
their foot in the door (R. 247). Then he testified that he opened the door slightly, at
which point someone put a foot in the door and threatened to pop [a cap] (R. 261).
15

People in trouble with the law often inculpate others to detract from the.it
own liability. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1999); Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 126-28 (1968); and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986).
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conflicted with Christian's version, which implied that Wesley and Joshua pulled their
guns only after people did not immediately obey Dexter when he initiated the

•

robbery (R. 252). Counsel should have called Ryan to testify as to this important
detail, as it was apparently Christian's version of the pulling of guns that led the judge
to believe that the use of the guns was "well planned." (ll. 372-73).
These were highly prejudicial objective deficiencies, for the juvenile court
characterized this robbery as a forced entry home invasion robbery, and found that
the forced entry and home invasion aspects of the robbety were aggravating in her
assessment of the public interest in having Cooper transferred to the adult court (R.
195-96). The court also focused on what the court believed was the "well planned"
use of the guns (R. 372-73) in issuing the ·bindover order - when there was
substantial evidence undermining the court's perceptions of a well-orchestrated home
invasion robbeiy, as discussed above.
4.

•

Public Safety

Counsel did not present any expert testimony or other information or specific
argument to aid the juvenile court judge in assessing whether public safety was better
served by retaining Cooper in the juvenile system.
The results of psychological testing conducted by Dr. Matt Davies after
Cooper was sent to prison and then transferred to the Daggett County Jail reflect that
Cooper scored as na:ive and unsophisticated, a rule follower, rather than a rule
breaker, lacking a history of impulsive or aggressive behavior, and appropriately
empathetic and responsive to others' feelings (R. 410). His test scores show a low
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risk for aggressive or violent behavior (R. 410). He had no elevated scores as are
commonly seen with adolescents who have problems with violence, aggression, and
non-compliance (R. 410). His testing shows no mental illness, although he may have
been delayed in his ability to identify and express his feelings consistently (R.. 410).
In discussing the crime during the evaluation, Cooper said he had no part in
planning it, and when he found out what Wesley and Dexter planned to do, he knew
it was wrong but did not know what to do (R. 411). He recognized the need to make
amends for his criininal behavior, understood the impact of his and his coperpetrators' conduct on the victims, and ·wished that the crimes had never happened

(R. 411). The evaluation explained that because of Cooper's age and possible mild
developmental immaturity, he did not have a completely developed capacity to think
through and anticipate consequences of his own actions (R. 412). While Cooper
recognized in hindsight that he could have derailed the crime, his test data suggested
that at the time of the offense, he did not have the emotional wherewithal to
intercede (R.. 412-413). The evaluation noted studies showing that regions of the
brain necessary to cognitive control are not yet developed in adolescents, and that
social context heavily influences decision-making in adolescents, who are more prone
to take risks to gain peer approval (R. 412 and n.21).
The evaluation addressed the public safety interest in his retention in the
juvenile court, explaining that juveniles incarcerated with adults are more likely to be
physically and sexually abused while incarcerated, a higher incidence of mental illness,
and are 7 .7 times more likely to commit suicide than juveniles held in juvenile
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facilities. When released from adult facilities, such juveniles have significantly
increased rate of recidivism (R. 412 and nn. 19-20). The evaluation concluded that if
he were returned to the juvenile system, Cooper would benefit from the resources
available there, and could grow intellectually, emotionally and physically in that less
stressful environment (R. 413). As in Houskeeper, supra, Cooper was prejudiced by
his counsel's failure to prepare with a necessary expert.

5.

Cooper's and the Public's Interest in Retention

With regard to Cooper's and the public's interest in his remaining in the
juvenile system, counsel presented no evidence or information to the court regarding
the risks posed to minors in the adult system, and the effects of adult prosecution on
their recidivism. He argued that Cooper would be a felon and under bad influences if
he went into the adult system, although he might get a lighter sentence, and that
counsel believed they could nip the serious crime in the bud by keeping him under
the supervision of the juvenile system (PH 122-123).
Counsel's argument and failure to provide evidence were objectively deficient.
People sentenced to our prisons may be injured and killed. 16 Utah does not comply
with the Prison Rape Elimination Act standards designed to protect minors housed in
adult facilities from sexual assault (R. 224-225). See
http://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea final rule.pdf, page 6. According findings
See,~ Salt Lake Tribune, "Investigators Identify Utah Prison Inmates
Involved in Fatal Fight," (detailing homicide of one inmate by another); Salt Lake
Tribune, June 25, 2014, ccrnmate Stabbed in Gang Fight at Utah State Prison,"
(detailing stabbings of two inmates).
16
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entered by Congress in conjunction with the enactment of PR.EA, juveniles housed in
adult facilities are five times more hl~ely to be sexually assaulted than those housed in
juvenile facilities, often within the first forty-eight hours of being incarcerated.
"Public Law 108-79, September 4, 2003," Office ofJuvenile and Delinquenq Programs,
United States Department of Justice, September 4, 2003, found at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ79/PLAY-108publ79.pdf. Federal
Prison Rape reporting law statistics show that the Utah State Prison has ranked
among the least safe for inmates nationwide. 17 As Dr. Davies indicated in his
evaluation, juveniles who are housed with adults are 7.7 more likely than those
housed with juveniles to commit suicide, and that juveniles housed with adults also
have much higher rates of recidivism and physical and sexual abuse than juvenile
offenders housed with juveniles.

~

R. 412, nn. 2 and 4.

The warden's well-intended tempora11r solution of placing Cooper in solitary
confinement (R.. 114-115) has well-known adverse side effects such as increased rates
of suicide and psychosis, particularly given the developmental immaturity of juvenile
offenders. See, ~ "Alone and Afraid: Children Housed in Solitary Confinement
17

In 2007, the Utah State Prison was listed among the eleven facilities wherein
the highest percentages of inmates experienced nonconsensual sex1:tal contact, see
Table 5 in ht1:p://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf). Current
statistics on the Prison Rape Elimination Act specific to each state are apparently
unavailable, but general statistics are grim. See generally
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=20. 2012 statistics show that 9.6 percent
of incarcerated people were sexually assaulted in our counu-y's jails and prisons in
2012; 7 .5 percent of prison inmates were molested; whereas 1.8 percent of jail
inmates were, and that the rate of sexual assaults in prisons had increased from 4.8
percent to 7.5 percent. See .h!.!.u://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca12.pdf. It
appears that lack of funding has limited the availability of more recent studies. See
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=278.
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and Isolation in Juvcnile Detention and Correctional Facilities," CT une 2014),

(!lliP-s://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Alone%20and%20Afraid%20COMPLETE%20F
INAL.pdf).
The foregoing information was key to the court's accurate assessment of the
public's safety interests and general interests and Cooper's interest in his remaining in
the juvenile system, and Cooper's lack of relative culpability and premeditation in his
role in the offense. Counsel's failure to investigate and present the key law and
evidence was objectively deficient, not strategic. Strickland. Particularly in light of
the evidence presented at the hearing and the court's ruling, summarized herein, there
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had counsel performed in an
objectively reasonable fashion by investigating the facts and law and prepating the
retention case.

6.

Failure to Challenge Prejudicial Hearsay

Counsel was ineffective in failing to oppose prejudicial hearsay evidence. SYO
preliminary hearings are unique and focus not only on probable cause, but also on
retention in the juvenile court. They are presided over by juvenile court judges, not
magistrates. See,~' M.C. v. State, supra, 916 P.2d at 917-918 (discussing why
juvenile court judges presiding over SYO hearings are not considered magistrates
under Utah R. Crim. P. 7). While hearsay is admissible as to probable cause, Utah R.
Juv. P. 220), in the retention portion of the hearings, juveniles have the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses, Utah R. Juv. P. 23A(d). While the rules contemplate two
separate phases of such hearings, in practice, the retention factors pertaining to the
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minor's relative culpability, and the extent to which his role was violent, aggressive or
premeditated, are often and naturally addressed in the probable cause portion of the
hearing wherein the crimes are proved.
Much of the most damaging evidence was hearsay as to Cooper, whose SYO
preliminary hea1-ing was held jointly with Joshua Dutson's without objection by
Cooper's counsel. Much of the hearsay came from co-defendants and others who
were in deep trouble with the law themselves, and had the resultant need to curry
favor with the police and prosecuting authorities by inculpating others. As a result of
the bias that is engendered in such situations, their statements were unreliable as a
matter of law. See,~' Lillv, B1uton and Lee, supra. Counsel should have objected
to the joint preliminary hearings of Cooper and Joshua, and objected to the hearsay,
particularly that from constitutionally unreliable witnesses, or subpoenaed them for
cross-examination.
For instance, Detective Barker testified without objection that there were
multiple robberies that day, wherein the five suspects had robbed multiple victims of
cologne, a leather jacket, and marijuana, supposedly in Ogden, North Ogden,
Harrisville, and Roy (R. 285-86). Trial counsel did not object to the hearsay
embodied in this testimony or clarify that only Dexter Skinner and Wesley Brow11
were charged in other robberies (R. 167-73), and that Cooper was not
The rules of evidence generally apply in juvenile court. See Utah R. Juv. P. 43.
The assertions regarding the other robberies qualified as hearsay tl1at was not
admissible to show probable cause for the crimes at issue in this preliminaty hearing,
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and should have been excluded under Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 23A(d), supra,
and Utah R. Evidence 801(c)(1) and (2) (defining hearsay as a statement made by the
declarant outside of court and admitted by a party to prove the truth of the assertion
in the statement); Rule 802 (excluding hearsay). Under Utah Rules of Evidence 401
through 404, before such evidence of extrinsic crimes was admitted, the Government
should have shown a proper non-character purpose for the evidence, which should
have been relevant to a material fact, and the probative value of the evidence should
not have been exceeded by its potential for prejudice. See,~-, State v. Decorso, 993
P.2d 837 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). Evidence of the other crimes
was not admitted for any proper non-character purpose, was not relevant to any
material fact, and was hugely prejudicial to Cooper. The prejudice stemming from
such evidence is recognized as a matter of law. E.g., Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988).
The detective summarized Joshua's allegation.s about the charged robbery,
wherein Joshua initially claimed that Cooper had a gun during the robbery, and then
said Cooper had a switchblade (R. 284). He also read Joshua Dutson's 1102
statement into the record to the effect that they all agreed on Wesley's plan before
going to Christian Davidson's, without any hearsay objection from Cooper's counsel

(R. 282-89). Given Joshua's motive to exculpate himself by inculpating others,
counsel should have objected to this unreliable hearsay. ~ Lilly, Lee and Biuton,

supra.
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•

Counsel's failures to investigate, research and present Cooper's retention case
are not properly characterized as strategy, as lawyers cannot make valid strategic
decisions absent reasonably necessary and thorough investigation of the facts and the
law. E.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
Particularly when the evidence and law discussed above that were omitted or
mishandled by counsel are compared to the information presented at the SYO
hearing and the juvenile court's ruling, discussed herein, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result had counsel properly investigated and presented
Cooper's case for retention. Cf. Houskeeper, supra.

•

•

III.

THE JUVENILE COURTS MISINTERPRETATIONS OF THE
AMENDED SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER STATUTE
REQUIRE REVERSAL.

A.

COOPER'S RELATIVE CULPABILI1YWAS THE
LOWEST AMONG THE DEFENDANTS'.

SYO cases necessarily involve violent crimes. 18 Courts must compare the
relative culpability of the participants to dete1'mine whether a child should be retained
in the protective confines of the juvenile court. See State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318,

if 29, 79 P .3d 951, supra.

Under 78A-6-702(c)(ii) (2013), because there were multiple

perpetrators, the court should have assessed whether Cooper appeared "to have a
greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants.''

The SYO act applies to aggravated arson, aggravated assault with serious
bodily injury, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery,
aggravated sexual assault, felony discharge of a fireru.m, attempted aggravated murder,
attempted murder, and felony-level weapons offenses committed by juveniles with
prior convictions of that type.
18
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The court found Cooper's culpability significant, but did not articulate the
culpability of the defendants other than Cooper for purposes of comparison and did
not actually find whether Cooper had a greater or lesser degree of culpability in
comparison to all the others involved in the crime (R. 19 5).
Without carefully comparing Cooper's culpability to the co-defendants', the
court was in no position to make a meaningful assessment of whether Cooper should
remain in juvenile court. As explained in Point II B 2, above, the relative culpability
factor should have weighed heavily in favor of Cooper's retention in juvenile court
In the court's oral ruling, despite the fact that Joshua brandished a gun that
came from Tomek Perkins during the robbery, the court found that Cooper's
involvement was greater than Joshua's because the guns came from Cooper's home
and the use of the guns was "well planned." (R. 372-73). The court found this in the
marked absence of reliable evidence that Cooper had anything to do with any
planned or spontaneous use of the guns by Joshua and the other two defendants who

•

used them during the robbery. 19 But see,~ Lara (requiring courts to distinguish
and focus on role of the individual juvenile in assessing retention factors).
The court did not require an evaluation of Cooper prior to sending him to
adult court, although Cooper's father complained at a detention hearing that no one
19

The evidence as to use of guns was Davidson's allegation that the two
gunmen aside from Skinner pulled their guns out after Davidson laughed and asked if
Skinner was kidding when Skinner pulled his gun and began the robbery (R. 252-53,
310) -- a series of events that appears unpredictable and unplanned. In contrast,
Ryan Golding's 1102 statement, read into the record, indicated that a second person
began the robbery by pulling his gun when Skinner was showing Golding Skinner's
gun (R. 264-65).
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•

had investigated Cooper's character or contacted his parents, family or friends to see
who he is, and the court indicated that probation would be required to do so for the
future detention hearings (I'. 11/25/13). Had the court required a psychological
evaluation, evidence was readily available that Cooper was developmentally
susceptible to peer pressure, given his level of maturity and development. See Dr.
Davies' evaluation (R. 406). An evaluation would have confirmed that Cooper's
relative culpability was the lowest among the defendants involved in the robbe1-y. Id.
The court made no mention of the facts that Cooper was the youngest and second to
the smallest defendant and the least developmentally equipped to be making good
decisions, given his youth, who was further impaired by his marijuana use. 20

B.

COOPER'S ROLE IN THE OFFENSE WAS NOT
VIOLENT OR AGGRESSIVE AND WAS NOT HIGHLY
PREMEDITATED.

All crimes in SYO cases are violent, aggressive and usually premeditated to a
degree. Courts must focus on the role of the individual child and consider the extent
to which the role was violent, aggressive or premeditated in determining whether to
retain them in juvenile court. E.g. Lara, supra. In the court's ruling on the extent to
which Cooper's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive or

20

See,~' R. 406 (Dr. Davies' evaluation) and National Institute on Drug
Abuse, "DrugFacts: Marijuana," found at
http://\vww.drugabuse.gov/ publications/ drugfacts/ marijuana ("These effects
include altered perceptions and mood, impaired coordination, difficulty with thinking
and problem solving, and disrupted learning and memory. Marijuana also affects
brain development, and when it is used heavily by young people, its effects on
thinking and memory may last a long time or even be permanent.").
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premeditated manner, the court repeatedly attributed the violent and aggressive
actions of others to Cooper because he provided the guns they used (R. 195-96).

•

Had the court not misinterpreted but instead properly applied the statutory
language, the result would have been different, as the evidence showed that Cooper's
role in the offense was not violent or aggressive. There was no testimony that
Cooper was one of the people who showed a gun prior to entering the house, put his
foot in the door, or told Davidson he had to let them in and to go downstairs.
Cooper's role was so minimal that Christian Davidson believed there were only three
people involved in the robbery (T. 12/20/13: 8, 10),'when there were actually four

While he ambivalently identified Cooper as the third gunman who collected the
wallets (f. 12/20/13: 14, 72), Joshua Dutson admitted to being the third gunman (f.
12/20/13: 45). The court found insufficient evidence that Cooper brandished any
weapon during the entire offense (R. 195).
There is no evidence that Cooper threatened anyone in any way. Cooper's

liability for the offenses was accomplice liability, based on his presence and provision
of two of the three guns used by others in the robbery. The court should have
focused on Cooper's actual role during the offense in assessing his level of violence,
aggression and premeditation, rather than holding him accountable for the violent
and aggressive actions of his co-perpet.rators. Compare Lara, M.E.P.,
and F.L.R., supra.
As for premeditation, the court ruled that there were several steps in this
robbeq, and that Cooper could have extricated himself from it before it occurred (R.
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•

374). Rather than proceeding by assumption, the Court should have obtained a
psychological evaluation, for Cooper's adolescent brain was biologically less able to
anticipate the consequences of his actions, and he was developmentally not equipped
to extricate himself from the robbery despite knowing it was wrong. E.g. R. 406.
While Joshua Dutson told the police that everyone was aware of the plan that Wesley
created, there was no evidence presented that Cooper was involved in the actual
planning of the robbery of Christian Davidson and Ryan Golding. The text message
conversation between Joshua and Skinner shows that they were scheming to get
Cooper's father's guns the night before when Joshua invited Cooper to participate in
a separate text message conversation (R. 295-96, 450), and Wesley Brown planned the
robbery of Davidson, as he had previously lived in that home with him and knew he
would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306). Thus, the premeditation was primarily done by
the older, more sophisticated defendants and Cooper's role was less premeditated.

C.

THE PUBLIC SAFE'IY INTEREST CALLED FOR
COOPER'S RETENTION IN THE JUVENILE COURT.

The juvenile court's public safety analysis (R.. 196) echoed the outdated
thinking of M.E.P. and A.B., supra, that public safety is best served by moving Serious
Youth Offenders into the adult system, where potential sentences no1mally exceed
the limited years of jurisdiction remaining in the juvenile court. The court may well
have ruled differently had the court been aware of the purpose for the amendments
to the Serious Youtl1 Offender Act - to ensure that first time offenders such as
Cooper are rehabilitated in juvenile court, rather than criminalized, stigmatized and

45
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

released quickly and without treatment in the adult system, to recidivate more
violently in the future, supra.
The court's public safety analysis largely turned on the serious nature of the
offenses charged, and the potential volatility and hypothetical threats they can pose to
perpetrators, the police and the public, given that others may respond violently to
such crimes (R. 196). This general and hypothetical approach would ostensibly lead
to transfer in all SYO cases, which by nature involve violent crimes that can prompt
violent responses and pose th.teats to law enforcement and members of the public.
The court's belief that the crimes charged here are among the most serious in our
community similarly did not take into account the range of offenses subject to
retention under the SYO statute, which contemplates that retention in juvenile court
may be appropriate for even more se110us offenses involving intended and actual,
rather than potential, serious injuries or intended death to the victims. In
characterizing the crime as a dangerous breach of the sanctity of the home, the court
did not recognize that aggravated burglaries and robberies are among the crimes that
routinely result in SYO prosecutions under the statute, and that those minors who
commit such offenses are nonetheless subject to retention in the juvenile court
pursuant to the plain te1ms of§ 78a-6- 702 (2013). Nor did the court account for the
facts that the guns were not loaded, and that the robbery began after an amicable
conversation that Christian Davidson and Ryan Golding acknowledged occurred in
the basement before the robbery (R. 184, 264-65), countering the notion of a home
invasion robbery.
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•

In assessing the public's safety interest in Cooper's being prosecuted in adult
or juvenile court, the court did not requite an evaluation of Cooper by a psychologist,
and assumed from the facts of this case that there was a great likelihood of further
injury and harm. With a professional evaluation, the court could have had a solid
evidentiary basis for assessing the low risk of future harm posed by Cooper, his
amenability to reform, and the public safety interest in keeping Cooper in the juvenile
system (R.. 406-12).
The court held it against Cooper that he came from a loving family and good
home, because he chose to commit the crimes despite his fortunate upbringing (R.
196). The court did not consider that Cooper's upbringing and complete lack of

juvenile history demonstrated that the robbery was a significant aberration from his
law-abiding life \Vhich suggested that his caring parents would successfully aid him in

•

reforming during the five years he could remain in the juvenile system if he were
retained. The court concluded that Cooper needed a longer correctional period than
the five years the juvenile system could provide, despite his complete absence of prior
history and his good home, and his relatively minor and nonviolent role in the crime,
and the change in the SYO law to counteract such thinking.
D.

COOPER LACKED A QUALIFYING PRIOR WEAPONRELATED OFFENSE AND I-IAD NO PRIOR OFFENSES.

The court ruled twice that Cooper had no prior record in the juvenile court,
without separately recognizing one of the actual statuto1-y criteria: that he had no
prior weapons-related offense that would have been _a felony had he committed one
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(R. 194, 196), see Utah Code Ann. § 781\-6- 702(c)(i), supra. This is important because
it demonstrates the egregious type of juvenile history that might normally justify
transferring a minor into the adult court, which Cooper did not have. His complete
lack of a prior history in juvenile court should have weighed heavily and separately in
favor of retention. See House Bill 105 and legislative history, in the addendum.

E.

COOPER'S AND THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN
RETENTION IN JUVENILE COURT WERE HIGH.

The court perfunctorily found by clear and convincing evidence it was not in

•

Cooper's best interest to be prosecuted in adult court, and it was in the public's best
interest for him to be transferred to the adult court (R. 197) The court should have
expressly considered the reformative benefits available to Cooper in juvenile court, in

•

contrast to the risks posed to and harms that befall minors such as Cooper when they
go into the adult system, and how retaining Cooper in the juvenile system served the
public interest, as discussed above.

F.

•

THE COURT'S RULINGS PREJUDICED COOPER AND
ESTABLISH PREJUDICE FROM THE FAILURE TO
SELF-RECUSE.

Because all the retention factors should have weighed in favor of Cooper's
retention in juvenile court, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result
in the absence of the errors. As a result of the individual and cumulative prejudice
from the errors, reversal is in order. See F.L., 2015 UT App 224, 1 32 (reversing

SYO bindover ruling because in the absence of the juvenile court's misinterpretation
and misapplication of multiple retention factors, there was a reasonable probability of
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retention). As there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the
court been apprised of the relevant evidence and law, and had the court followed the
law, Cooper has proved prejudice under the plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrines. See Verde, supra.
The court's legal errors also prove prejudice from the failure to self-recuse,
assuming this were necessary. The judge's legal errors in the bindover decision satisfy
the abuse of discretion standard, which encompasses errors of law. See, ~ ' State v.
Barrett, 2005 UT 88,~~ 15-17, 127 P.3d 692 (review for abuse of discretion includes
review for errors of law). Under Alonzo, prejudice is shown because of the abuse of
discretion, because Cooper's substantial rights were affected, and because there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the judge recused hetself. Id.
932 P.2d 606, 611-612 (Utah 1\pp. 1997).

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm Van Huizen, and is urged to do so expeditiously.
Cooper will turn twenty years old on July 29, 2017. While counsel for Cooper
concedes nothing on this point, the juvenile court may well lose jurisdiction over him
in the event the case remains tied up in the appellate courts until he turns twenty-one.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78a-6-103(1)(A) 21 ; State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 63 P.3d

21

Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-103 provides in relevant part:

78A-6-103. Jurisdiction of juvenile court -- Original -- Exclusive.
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•
667 (affirming district court ruling that juvenile court lost jurisdiction over
defendant's juvenile offenses when the defendant turned twenty-one).

Respectfully submitted this ~ f ~ ' 2017.
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ooper Van Huizen

(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenil~ court has exclusive original
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance
or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law or
ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the violation
occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)(.]
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copies of to be printed, bound and mailed, along with a compact disc containing a
searchable PDF of this brief and the addenda, to the Criminal Appeals Division of
the Utah Attorney General's Office, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box

140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854.
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JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE J.
FREDERIC VOROS JR. and SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH
concurred. 1
ROTH, Judge:
'1(1
Cooper John Anthony Van Huizen was involved in an
aggravated robbery when he was sixteen years old. The State
charged him in juvenile court under the Serious Youth Offender
Act. After a hearing, the juvenile court bound Van Huizen over
to stand trial as an adult in district court as provided by the Act,
and he appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.
1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as

authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).
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State v. Van Huizen

BACKGROUND 2
i2
In late 2013, Van Huizen committed a robbery with a
friend and some acquaintances. At sixteen, Van Huizen was the
youngest of the group; his friend was also a juvenile and their
three acquaintances were adults. Although Van Huizen did not
orchestrate the robbery, he agreed to it and facilitated the plan
by providing guns from his family home.

In search of drugs, the group drove to the house of
someone they knew would possess marijuana. They knocked on
the back door, gained entry to the house and, brandishing the
guns taken from Van Huizen's home, proceeded to rob the
occupant of a cell phone, some cash, and a "little bit of weed."
Though Van Huizen did not carry a firearm or other weapon, he
was part of the group that entered the home and committed the
robbery.
<_[3

The State charged Van Huizen under the then-current
Serious Youth Offender Act (the Act). See generally Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-702 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (outlining the process
by which a juvenile could be ''bound over and held to answer in
the district court in the same manner as an adult"). 3 The Act
required that the State charge any minor accused of certain
serious felony offenses by filing a criminal information in

•

<_[4

2. Van Huizen has already been convicted as an adult in district
court. After his conviction, he successfully moved to reinstate
the time to appeal the juvenile court's bindover order. Thus, this
appeal concerns juvenile court proceedings and, on appeal, we
recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's
decision. See In re J.C., 2016 UT App 10, n.3, 366 P.3d 867.
3. The Utah Legislature amended the Act after the State brought
these charges. We address the Act as it existed at the time of Van
Huizen' s juvenile court proceedings in 2013.

20140602-CA
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State v. Van Huizen

juvenile court. Id. § 78A-6-702(1). Once filed, the Act directed the
court to l,l.Ildertake a two-pronged analysis. First, the State had
"to establish probable cause" that the defendant committed the
crime. Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(a). If the State proved probable cause,
the burden shifted to the defendant to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that "it would be contrary to the best
interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to bind
the defendant over." Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(d), (e).
In making the ultimate determination on whether to bind
the juvenile over to district court, the Act directed that "the
judge shall consider only" five factors:
<J{S

(i) whether the minor has been previously
adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a
felony if committed by an adult;
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more
other persons, whether the minor appears to have a
greater or lesser degree of culpability than the
codefendants;
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the
offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or
premeditated manner;
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior
adjudications in the juvenile court; and
(v) whether public safety is better served by
adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in
the district court.
Id.§ 78A-6-702(3)(c).

<JI6
Under that framework, the Weber County Attorney's
Office, acting on behalf of the State, charged Van Huizen in
juvenile court with two counts of aggravated robbery and one
count of aggravated burglary, all first degree felonies.
Unbeknown to Van Huizen and his parents, the juvenile court

20140602-CA
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judge assigned to his case was married to the then-Chief
Criminal Deputy in the Weber County Attorney's Office.
<_[7
The juvenile court determined that the State had met its
initial burden of proof and that there was probable cause to bind
Van Huizen over to the district court as an adult. In response,
Van Huizen put on evidence that both his and the public's
interests were both best served by remaining in the juvenile
system. Van Huizen and the State stipulated to factors one and
four, namely that he had no prior offenses and therefore no
offenses involving a dangerous weapon. On the other factors,
Van Huizen adduced testimony from his mother and father
relating to the stability of his home life, his generally good
nature, and his bright future.

•

•

<j{8
The juvenile court considered the evidence and
determined that Van Huizen had only carried half of his burden.
While Van Huizen had shown that his best interest was served
by remaining in juvenile court, he had not shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the public interests also favored
retention. The court bound Van Huizen over to district court.
Van Huizen did not timely appeal the bindover decision.
'119
In district court, the same deputy county attorney that
had handled the juvenile proceedings continued to prosecute
Van Huizen, and the attorney received at least some assistance
from the juvenile judge's husband, the Chief Criminal Deputy in
the prosecutor's office. Van Huizen eventually pleaded guilty to
two reduced counts of robbery, both second degree felonies. The
district court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of one to
fifteen years. He was paroled in November 2014.

':IllO

While he was serving his prison sentence, Van Huizen
retained new counsel and moved in district court to reinstate his
time to appeal the juvenile court's bindover order under
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. He supported the
motion by alleging that he had been denied his right to appeal
the bindover order through ineffective assistance of counsel,

20140602-CA
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11

•

asserting that trial counsel had misinformed [him] that the time
for appeal had run" when it in fact had not. The State stipulated
to Van Huizen's motion, and the district court reinstated his time
to file an appeal. On that basis, Van Huizen now appeals the
juvenile court's bind over order that initially transferred him into
district court. 4

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ci[ll Van Huizen argues that the juvenile judge who bound
him over was required to recuse herself under the Code of

•

Judicial Conduct. "Determining whether a trial judge committed
error by failing to recuse himself or herself under the Utah Code
of Judicial Conduct ... is a question of law, and we review such
questions for correctness." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979
(Utah 1998). Van Huizen also argues that the judge's "risk of
bias" in his case was so strong that it "violated due process"
under the United States Constitution. "Constitutional issues,
including questions regarding due process, are questions of law
that we review for correctness." In re E.K.S., 2016 UT 56, <jf 5
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

4. We note that, because Van Huizen's time to appeal the

juvenile court's bindover decision was reinstated after it lapsed,
he is taking this appeal on a more developed record than would
normally be available. Specifically, we have before us a district
court record that contains briefing, declarations, and other
materials that were not part of the juvenile court proceedings
and therefore would not have been available had this appeal
been taken immediately following the bindover decision. This
point is particularly salient as it applies to our resolution of this
case, which turns on record information that-because of its
introduction in district court after the bindover hearing-would
have been unavailable to us had Van Huizen' s appeal arrived in
this court under the usual tirneline.

20140602-CA
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112 Additionally, Van Huizen asserts that ineffective
assistance of c01;msel and the doctrine of plain error require that
we reverse the bindover order. Because we resolve this case on
the disqualification issue, we do not address Van Huizen's other
arguments.

ANALYSIS
113 Van Huizen argues that the juvenile court judge (the
Juvenile Judge) who bound him over into adult court should
have disqualified herself from his case because she was married
to the Chief Criminal Deputy in charge of the criminal division
in the Weber County Attorney's Office, the office that prosecuted
him. He argues first that the Code of Judicial Conduct required
the Juvenile Judge to recuse herself. Second, Van Huizen argues
that he was denied .constitutional due process due to the acute
"risk of bias" inherent in the Juvenile Judge's relationship with
the prosecuting office. The "general rule [is] that courts should
avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on
other grounds." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004
(Utah 1994). We therefore address the Code of Judicial Conduct
first, and because we resolve the appeal on that ground, we do
not reach the constitutional question.

I. The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct
<_{[14 The Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a]n
independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our
system of justice." Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Preamble. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter observed, courts possess "neither the purse nor
the sword," so their authority "ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in [their] moral sanction. Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). That core
principle is enshrined in our caselaw: "The purity and integrity
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the
11
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highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts."
Haslam v. lvforrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948).

<j[15 The Code lists the conditions under which a judge must
recuse or disqualify himself or herself. 5 Generally, "[a] judge
should act at all times in a manner that promotes-and shall not
undermine-public confidence in the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety." Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 1.2.
Specifically, "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." 6 Id. R. 2.11(A); accord Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79,
<j[ 49 (" A judge should be disqualified when circumstances arise
in which the judge's 'impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. (quoting State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah
111

1989))).

<j[16 Rule 2.ll(A) contains an illustrative, but not exhaustive,
list of disqualifying circumstances. In some circumstances, the
judge's duty to recuse is absolute. For instance, if "[t]he judge
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer," he or she must disqualify. Utah Code Jud. Conduct R.
2.ll(A)(l); see also id. R. 2.ll(C) (establishing that the presence of
actual bias or prejudice cannot be waived). In other

5. The

terms "recuse" and "disqualify" are generally
synonymous. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F .2d 764, 769
n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Whether or not there was ever a distinction
between disqualification and recusal, the courts now commonly
use the two terms interchangeably.").
6. The Code of Judicial Conduct defines "impartial" to mean the
"absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular
parties or classes of parties, as well as presence of an objective
and open mind in considering matters that come before a judge."
Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Terminology .

•
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circumstances, the judge must recuse unless he or she "disclose[s]
on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification" and "the
parties and lawyers agree . . . that the judge should not be
disqualified." Id. R. 2.ll(C). If the parties agree to such a waiver,
it "shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding." Id.
'1[17 Circumstances requiring disqualification absent waiver
include:
The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse
or domestic partner, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director, general partner, managing member, or
trustee of a party;
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by
the proceeding ....

Id. R. 2.ll(A)(2). Further, a judge "is disqualified whenever the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless
of whether any of the specific [listed disqualifying circumstances]
apply." Id. R. 2.11 cmt. 1. And the judge bears ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that the integrity of the process is
protected: "A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in
which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether
a motion to disqualify is filed." Id. R. 2.11 cmt 2; accord Regional
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 257 n.7 (Utah 1992)
(holding that it "was [the judge's] responsibility to identify her
relationship ... and take appropriate measures to recuse herself,"
not the responsibility of counsel).
'1[18 Thus, when a judge knows of circumstances that give rise
to the reasonable appearance of bias, the judge is under an
affirmative duty either to recuse or to disclose the facts that
contribute to an appearance of partiality and allow the parties to
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decide whether to waive disqualification. Indeed, "[a] judge
should disclose on the record information that the judge believes
the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant
to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no basis for disqualification." Utah Code Jud.
Conduct R. 2.11 cmt. 5. Hence, even if the judge believes that
recusal is not warranted under a given set of circumstances, it is
better to disclose facts that might reasonably raise a question
about impartiality and allow the parties to either waive the issue
or file a motion for disqualification that will then be resolved by
an independent judicial officer. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2)
(explaining that a motion to disqualify must either be granted or
referred to a different judicial officer for disposition).
<_[19 "The Utah Supreme Court has found the provisions of the
Code C?f Judicial Conduct to have legal force." American Rural
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Commc'n Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 195 n.12
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Cheek v. Clay Bulloch Constr. Inc.,
2016 UT App 227, <_[ 19, 387 P.3d 611 (collecting cases). For
instance, in Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, the supreme
court held that an appearance of impropriety under the Judicial
Code of Conduct "[was] sufficient to dispose of the case." 830
P.2d at 257-58.
120 In Utah law, as under federal law, the question of a
judge's impartiality is determined from the viewpoint of '" a
reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances."' West Jordan
City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, <j[ 22, 135 P.3d 874 (quoting 13A
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3549 (2d ed. 1984 & supp. 2005)). 7

•

7. The federal analogue to the Code of Judicial Conduct is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). Although the Utah rules and
the federal statute do not use identical language, "[s]ection
455(a)," like the Utah code, "is based upon the [ABA Model]
Code of Judicial Conduct, which clearly imposes a 'reasonable
(continued ... )
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As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

explained, "The reasonable observer is not the judge or even
someone familiar with the judicial system, but rather an average
member of the public." Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787
F.3d 1297, 1310 (10th Cir. 2015). "In conducting this [reasonable
person] review, we must ask how these facts would appear to a
well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than [a]
hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person." Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).

We now turn to the question in this case-whether there
was a reasonable question as to the impartiality of the Juvenile
Judge under the circumstances. If so, we must then determine
whether the appearance of partiality requires vacatur of the
bindover order and reconsideration by another judge.
ci[21

A.

Appearance of Partiality

We note at the outset that our thorough review of the
record gives us no reason to think the Juvenile Judge was
actually biased against Van Huizen. However, as we discussed
above, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge's
disqualification under many circumstances that fall short of
actual bias, such as situations where a reasonable person would
question the judge's impartiality. In this case, it is uncontested
that the Juvenile Judge that bound Van Huizen over for
prosecution in district court was married to the Chief Criminal
Deputy in the Weber County Attorney's Office. It is also
uncontested that the Juvenile Judge did not disclose that
information to the parties on the record.
ci[22

(... continued)
person' test for recusal." 13D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3549
(3d ed. supp. 2016). Thus, we consider federal cases addressing
the "reasonable person" standard helpful to our analysis.
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<J{23 Van Huizen argues that the spousal relationship required
the Juvenile Judge to disqualify herself under rule 2.11. The rule
requires recusal where, among other things, the judge's spouse
is "a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general
partner, managing member, or trustee of a party." Utah Code
Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(2)(a). Van Huizen asserts that the Chief
Criminal Deputy was "properly considered an officer, director
or managing member of a party" -in this case, the State. Van
Huizen does not, however, explain that argument in detail. He
apparently relies instead on the plain language, arguing that the
Chief Criminal Deputy obviously was among the class of people
denoted in rule 2.11 for which a spousal relationship with the
judge created the appearance of partiality.
'Il24 The State argues in response that the Chief Criminal
Deputy was not covered under the plain language of the rule.
because he was not "an 'officer, director, general partner,
managing member, or trustee' of the State of Utah in the sense
that those terms are used in rule 2.11." The State does not
explain precisely in what sense the rule uses those terms, but the
point seems to be based on the distinction between government
entities and corporate entities. That is, terms such as "general
partner," "managing member," and "trustee" suggest positions
within a private entity or corporate structure, not within a
government body. Accordingly, the State's position appears to
be the inverse of Van Huizen's-that the Chief Criminal
Deputy's position is categorically outside the scope of rule
2.ll(A)(2)(a).

•

<J{25 We are not persuaded that the plain language of rule
2.ll(A)(2)(a) answers the question presented. Taking just one
term as an example, "officer" applies to both governments and
private entities. For instance, "officer" is defined broadly as
"anyone elected or appointed to an office or position of authority
in a government, business, institution, society, etc." Officer,
Webster's New World College Dictionary 1015 (5th ed. 2016).
Similarly, Black's defines "officer" as "[s]omeone who holds an
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office of trust, authority, or command." Officer, Black's Law
Dictionary 1257 (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that, in public affairs,
an officer is someone who holds a public government office and
is "authorized by that government to exercise some specific
function"). These definitions make clear the concept of an
"officer" is broader than the State acknowledges and could
apply to a position like the Chief Criminal Deputy's.
<J[26 But on the other hand, the plain language of rule
2.11(A)(2)(a) does not clearly apply to the Chief Criminal Deputy
either. While the Chief Criminal Deputy is undoubtedly
authorized by the government to "exercise a specific function," it
is unclear whether he was "elected or appointed" to his position
of authority as understood by the term's definition. For instance,
it is likely that the Weber County Attorney-the Chief Criminal
Deputy's boss-would be properly considered an officer under
the plain meaning of the term. Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-101(1)
(LexisNexis 2013) (enumerating the county attorney as one of the
"elected officers of a county"). However, it does not
automatically follow that the Weber County Attorney's Chief
Criminal Deputy is likewise an officer of the State for purposes
of the rule.

•

•
•

<j127 We are not persuaded that rule 2.11(A)(2)(a)' s language
either plainly applies or plainly does not apply to the Chief
Criminal Deputy. Rather, rules 2.11(A)(2)(b) and (c), which
trigger recusal when a judge's spouse is "acting as a lawyer in
the proceeding" or "has more than a de minimis interest that
could be substantially affected by the proceeding," seem more
applicable. Relevant cases have often employed these concepts
in addressing similar conditions, and we accordingly now
consider how disqualification rules have been addressed in like
circumstances. In doing so, we keep in mind a consideration we
discussed earlier-that the disqualification rule is meant to be
applied broadly "whenever the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the
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11

specific [listed disqualifying circumstances] apply . Utah Code
Jud. Conduct R. 2.11 cmt. 1.
1.

Applicable Caselaw

128 We are aware of no published Utah decisions that analyze
a relationship like the one at issue here, where the judge is
closely related to an attorney who is not directly involved in the
proceedings before the judge, but is nonetheless a supervisor in
the public law office of the attorney handling the case in court. In
the absence of Utah precedent, Van Huizen directs our attention
to a Colorado case, Smith v. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. App.
1984). In Beckman, a county court judge was married to a deputy
district attorney who "handle[d] matters exclusively in the
district court," a separate court from the judge's own. Id. at 1215.
The criminal defendant in Beckman, originally scheduled for trial
in county court before the county judge, requested a writ from
the district court to prevent the county judge from presiding
over his trial. He argued that the judge's spousal relationship to
a prosecutor justified disqualification. Id. Even though the
attorney spouse was not an active lawyer on the case, the district
court found that "the powers of a deputy district attorney are
akin to that of a partner in a private law firm, and thus the
judge's recusal was necessary. Id.
11

<j[29 On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected that
analysis and held that a deputy district attorney is not like a
partner at a law firm "because his compensation and clientele
are set, and the prestige of the office as a whole is not greatly
affected by the outcome of a particular case." Id. at 1216.
However, the court nevertheless held "that the husband-wife
relationship" required recusal. Id. at 1215. The court reasoned
that,
II

Generally, the public views married people as a
couple," as "a partnership," and as participants in
a relationship more intimate than any other kind of
relationship between individuals. In our view the
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existence of a marriage relationship between a
judge and a deputy district attorney in the same
· county is sufficient to establish grounds for
disqualification, even though no other facts call
into question the judge's impartiality.

Id. at 1216. The appellate court reached that conclusion even
though the county judge and the district attorney "[had] drafted
guidelines designed to further insulate [the attorney spouse]
from all contact with any county court cases." Id. at 1215. Thus,
the Beckman court determined that the spousal relationship is so
close in nature that it outweighs other factors, including the
screening procedure implemented by the county attorney's
office and the manifest distinctions between private and public
law firms.
'i[30 The State counters with a more recent Minnesota Court of
Appeals case, In re Jacobs, 791 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
In Jacobs, as in Beckman, Jacobs argued that "the assigned judge's
impartiality can reasonably be questioned based on his spouse's
employment with the [prosecuting] County Attorney's Office."
Id. at 301. And like Van Huizen in this case, Jacobs based his
claim on rule 2.11 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct,
which is functionally identical to our own rule 2.11. Compare
Utah Code of Jud. Conduct R. 2.ll(A)(2), with Minnesota Code of
Jud. Conduct R. 2.1 l(A)(2).
'i[31 The appellate court rejected Jacobs' argument, concluding
that "Jacobs has not shown that the judge's impartiality can
reasonably be questioned." Id. at 302. "Assuming that a judge's
spouse is not personally involved in a case, the personal interest,
if any, of the judge's spouse in the prosecution of that case to
conviction would be de minimis" and would not call for
disqualification. Id. at 302. That reasoning was based, in part, on
the fact that the "[Hennepin] County Attorney's Office is a large
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office that prosecutes a large volume of cases." 8 Id. The court also
noted "that prosecutors are not merely advocates but also
'ministers of justice' charged with protecting the rights of the
accused as well as the rights of the public." Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, as the State notes, the Jacobs court specifically analyzed
Beckman and determined that the "trend of the case law has been
against the holding in Beckman." Id. Specifically, the court's
analysis of other holdings led it to conclude the "closeness of the
marital relationship, relied on in Beckman, is counter-balanced by
the institutional aspects of employment in a public law firm such
as a county attorney's office.'' Id.
We agree with the Minnesota Court of Appeals that
Beckman is a relative outlier in the caselaw governing when a
judge must disqualify based on a spousal relationship with an
attorney in the relevant prosecuting office. For example, in State
v. Harrell the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a judge's
recusal from a case was not required simply because his wife
was an assistant district attorney in same county. 546 N.W.2d
115, 118 (Wis. 1996). Likewise, in Sensley v. Albritton the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected an
argument that a judge should have recused himself because his
"spouse was an Assistant District Attorney in the office of [the]
District Attorney ... , whose office also represented the
Defendants" in the case. 385 F.3d 591,598 (5th Cir. 2004).
ci[32

<][33 Although we agree that Beckman sets a relatively strict
standard for disqualification compared to other cases dealing
with similar facts, we note that none of the cases taking a more
lenient approach, nor Beckman itself, involved an attorney spouse
with supervisory authority within the government office in
question. Indeed, the arguments for disqualification rejected by
appellate courts have generally been based on the assertion that
8. Hennepin County includes within its boundaries the city of
Minneapolis.
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government agencies are akin to private firms for purposes of
judicial disqualification; the arguments have not focused on the
particular responsibilities of the spouse-such as a managerial
role-that raise more specific concerns.9 For these reasons, we
find the approach taken in Beckman to be of limited use in our
resolution of this case.
ci[34 However, the State's reliance on the facts and reasoning
of In re Jacobs is likewise misplaced because the prosecutor
spouse in Jacobs was not a supervisor within the county
prosecutor's office like the Chief Criminal Deputy was in this
case. In addition, the Jacobs court relied on the size of the district
attorney's office as an insulating factor that diminishes a judge
spouse's appearance of partiality, a factor that holds far less
sway here. In Jacobs, the court noted that the Hennepin County
Atton1ey' s Office was "a large office that prosecutes a large
volume of cases," 791 N.W.2d at 302, whereas here we are

9. We find no reason to disagree with the majority of decisions
that have determined that, due to the differences in both
institutional and economic incentives, a group of government
attorneys is not necessarily similar to a group of private
attorneys for the purposes of the judicial disqualification of a
spouse. See Smith v. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Colo. App.
1984) (holding that, unlike a public attorney, "[a] partner in a
law firm is said to be 'engaged' in every case in which a member
of his firm represents a party, primarily because he has a
financial interest in the outcome of the case"); In re Jacobs, 791
N.W.2d 300, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting the institutional
difference between prosecutorial offices and private firms);
accord Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 258 n.8
(Utah 1992) (citing favorably Beckman, 683 P.2d at 1216, for the
proposition that public attorneys typically do not benefit from a
judge's decision in the way that some private attorneys do).
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addressing the substantially smaller Weber County Attorney's
Office. 10
135 Thus, while we are not inclined to follow the Colorado
decision in Smith v. Beckman, as Van Huizen urges, we are not
persuaded by the State that the Minnesota Court of Appeals
approach from In re Jacobs is fully applicable here, either.
2.

The Pertinent Facts

136 Having discovered no precedent to guide our resolution
of these particular circumstances-where a judge is married to
an attorney with a supervisory role within the office prosecuting
the case-we consider the specific circumstances at issue here.
137 It is uncontested that the Juvenile Judge did not disclose
her relationship to the Chief Criminal Deputy in the Weber
County Attorney's Office during the juvenile phase of the case
and Van Huizen learned of the relationship only after he was
bound over as an adult. 11 As a consequence, no knowing and

10. "As the largest public law office in Minnesota, with more
than 400 employees, [the Hennepin County Attorney's Office]
handle[s] tens of thousands of adult felony, juvenile and civil
cases each year." 2015 Highlights, Hennepin County Attorney,
http://www.hennepinattorney.org/highlights2015 [https://perma.
cc/NV6H-6EEE]. See also QuickFacts, Hennepin County,
Minnesota, United States Census Bureau, http://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/27053,49057 [https://perma.cc/
8VVM-E3CK] (comparing the July 1, 2015 populations of
Hennepin County (1,223,149) and Weber County (243,645)).
11. We acknowledge that the Juvenile Judge may have assumed
that the litigants, or more probably their lawyers, were generally

aware that her husband was the Chief Criminal Deputy and that
the lawyers would raise a concern if one were warranted. We
(continued ... )
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voluntary waiver of any perceived partiality could have
occurred here, nor did Van Huizen have the facts necessary to
move to disqualify the Juvenile Judge. 12 Further, the record
shows that the Chief Criminal Deputy had at least some
involvement in Van Huizen's case once he was bound over to
the district court. For instance, the Chief Criminal Deputy
himself responded on behalf of the Weber County Attorney to
communications from Van Huizen' s current counsel when
counsel substituted into the case. In addition, the district court's
docket shows that the Chief Criminal Deputy requested digital
copies of several proceedings, on behalf of either himself or a
colleague, on the same day that his spouse signed the bindover
order.
<j[38 The record does not reveal the specific nature of the
relationship between the Chief Criminal Deputy and the deputy
county attorney who actually handled Van Huizen' s case. The
only information contained in the record on that point comes
(... continued)
agree with the Vermont Supreme Court, however, that "[i]t is
not appropriate to make such an assumption." Velardo v. Ovitt,
2007 VT 69, 129 n.3, 933 A.2d 227 (addressing a situation where
"the assistant judge [may have] thought that the litigants or their
lawyers were generally aware of the sibling relationship"
between the judge and a guardian ad litem). This is particularly
the c·ase given that it is the party's decision, in consultation with
counsel, whether to waive a potential conflict, not the attorney's.
See Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.ll(C) (allowing waiver only if
the "parties and lawyers agree" to waive, and incorporate the
agreement into the record).
12. In a sworn declaration, Van Huizen stated that, "If I had
known" that the Juvenile Judge "[was] married to the Chief
Deputy of the Criminal Division," "I would have requested a
different judge who had no ties to the office prosecuting me."
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from a brief filed in district court after the bindover in question.
In that filing, the State represented that the Chief Criminal
Deputy "does not supervise the attorneys in juvenile court; he
does not screen cases in juvenile court and is not involved in
juvenile court matters, those responsibilities are under the
purview of other attorneys."

•

•

<J[39 We accept that characterization of the Chief Criminal
Deputy's role in the juvenile court proceeding. And while we
accept the State's general characterization of the workflow in the
Weber County Attorney's Office, we also note that on appeal the
State does not contest Van Huizen' s basic premise, namely that
his juvenile bindover hearing was criminal in nature. See Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(1) (providing that actions against minors
accused of crimes like the one at issue here "shall be [filed] by
criminal information"). That premise suggests that the attorney
handling the matter in juvenile court interacted with the Chief
Criminal Deputy's at some level, even if the chain of command
had an additional supervisory layer while the case was in
juvenile court.
<][40 The record before us seems to confirm that inference. For
example, a single county prosecutor represented the State
throughout this case, first in the juvenile court and then in the
district court after bindover. Particularly given that the Chief
Criminal Deputy had at least some involvement with the case
once it reached district court and there is no evidence in the
record of a screening procedure, it seems unlikely that the Chief
Criminal Deputy was completely walled off from the juvenile
court proceedings in Van Huizen's case. Similarly, we cannot
conclude that there was a separation of any substance between
the juvenile and the adult proceedings-Van Huizen's entire
case appears to have occurred within the same organizational
line at the county attorney's office. Indeed, the case attorney and
the Chief Criminal Deputy apparently worked together on the
case once it arrived in district court. Therefore, because he was
head of the criminal division of the Weber County Attorney's
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Office and the same attorney represented the State throughout
Van Huizen' s prosecution in juvenile and district court, it is
reasonable to conclude that the Chief Criminal Deputy was in
the chain of command over the attorney handling the juvenile
side of the case, even if he did not supervise the juvenile portion
directly.
<_I[41 In any event, the overall goal of the county attorney's
office was to move Van Huizen from juvenile court to district
court by means of the bindover proceeding-from a forum
where the Chief Criminal Deputy may have had some
attenuated role to one where it is clear the Chief Criminal
Deputy exercised supervisory authority. With this backdrop in
mind, we now consider the nature of various positions within
the county attorney command hierarchy as they relate to the
question before us.
3.

Implications of the County Attorney's Chain of Command

<][42 We begin our analysis at one end of the chain of
command, with the proposition that the Juvenile Judge would
have been obligated to recuse had the Chief Criminal Deputy
actually appeared in or worked on Van Huizen's juvenile case
directly-that is, if he had been a counsel of record. Under rule
2.11(A)(2)(b), disqualification is required in any situation where
the judge's spouse is "acting as a lawyer in the proceeding."
<j[43 Similarly, at the other end of the chain of command, there
is little question that the Juvenile Judge would have been
obligated to recuse if her spouse was the Weber County
Attorney himself-the Chief Criminal Deputy's boss-for at
least three reasons. First, a county attorney appears to be within
the class of officers of a party explicitly covered by the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 17-18a-301(1)
(LexisNexis 2013) (stating that "[t]he county attorney is an
elected officer"), with Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(2)(a)
(requiring a judge to recuse when her spouse is "an officer ... of
a party").
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<J[44 Second, a county attorney seems to be among the class of
persons who have "more than a de minimis interest that could
be substantially affected by the proceeding." Utah Code Jud.
Conduct R. 2.1 l(A)(2)( c}. 13 This is because, as the elected official
in charge of prosecutions for the county, the county attorney is
ultimately responsible for individual case outcomes. See Utah
Code Ann. § 17-53-106(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2013) (making "the
management of deputies and other employees" one of the
professional duties of a county attorney). Further, we note that a
county attorney's office is tied directly to the ballot box, and
although individual votes may be subject to a wide variety of
influences, a candidate's perceived performance in office is
certainly among the factors that are likely to inform electoral
choice. And while we recognize that voters do not often choose
to either support or disavow a given candidate based on the
outcome of individual cases such as this, case outcomes as a
whole certainly can affect voter choice. Thus, although not at the
same level as a member of a private law firm with a direct
economic interest in case outcomes, the county attorney's interest
in the results of his staff's work is not simply de minim.is.
<J[45 Third, the county attorney typically makes an appearance
in every case brought by his or her office. Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 17-18a-202(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2013) (making the county
attorney a "public prosecutor for the county"), with id. § 17-lSa401(1) (mandating that a public prosecutor "shall ... conduct, on
behalf of the state, all prosecutions for a public offense
committed within a county"). The county attorney is therefore
typically counsel of record in every criminal case because it is on
his behalf that his attorney-staff charges defendants and
prosecutes cases. See New York Adv. Comm. on Jud. Ethics Op.
13. '"De minimis,' in the context of interests pertaining to
disqualification of a judge, means an insignificant interest that
could not raise a reasonable question regarding the judge's
impartiality." Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Terminology.
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07-216 (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/

opinions/07-216 .htm [h ttp://perma.cc/WFSS-GSFM] (determining
that a judge whose sibling was the district attorney "must
disqualify him/herself" because "the District Attorney ... is
involved either directly or indirectly in all criminal cases
prosecuted in the county where the judge presides"). As a
consequence, the Juvenile Judge would have been obligated to
recuse had she been married to the county attorney for the same
reason that she would have been required to recuse if she were
married to the case attorney-they are both "acting as a lawyer
in the proceeding." Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A}(2)(b).
<J[46 Thus, the Juvenile Judge would have been obligated to
recuse herself if her husband had been on either end of the chain
of command-trial counsel or county attorney. But in this case,
the Chief Criminal Deputy was somewhere in the space
between, where the determination is less clear. Here, we turn
again to the basic purpose of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which is meant to be read broadly to protect "[t]he purity and
integrity of the judicial process ... against any taint of suspicion
to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." Haslam v.
Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948). The Chief Criminal
Deputy, by the nature of his position, is responsible to the
County Attorney for the performance of the attorneys below him
in the supervisory line. And given that the Juvenile Judge would
have been required to recuse if she had been married to either
the Chief Criminal Deputy's subordinate or the Chief Criminal
Deputy's superior, we believe that, in a public law office, the
command hierarchy itself is material to the appearance of
partiality. Thus, because we have determined that the Chief
Criminal Deputy was within the chain of command for this case,
we conclude that his marriage to the Juvenile Judge created an
appearance of partiality.
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1{47 While we are aware of no reported cases that are directly
on point, several state ethics opinions have relied on a similar
analysis.
There can be no debate over the inappropriateness
of a judge hearing cases involving the office of a
District Attorney when the elected District Attorney
is a close relative of the judge . . . . Likewise, a
disinterested person would reasonably conclude
that the professional relationship between a District
Attorney and his or her Chief Assistant is such that
the same standard applies when the judge is a close
relative of the District Attorney's Chief Assistant or
another District Attorney with a supervisory role.
Georgia Jud. Ethics Op. No. 238, 2013 WL 9638986, at *3 (May 1,
2013); see also, e.g., New York Jud. Adv. Op. 10-05, 2010 WL
8149118, at *1 (Mar. 2, 2010) (explaining that "the Committee
previously has advised that a judge must disqualify him/herself
when the judge's spouse holds a supervisory position in a public
law office"). Indeed, there is support for the proposition that a
chief criminal deputy may present a greater concern than the
county attorney himself, because the chief criminal deputy is
more directly responsible for prosecutorial functions. The New
York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics explained that,
in this instance, the LJudge's] spouse is in a position
just below the attorney-in-chief, to whom he/she
reports, and it is the spouse who bears the
responsibility of overseeing all criminal practice
operations including the very operations involved
herein: State criminal trial proceedings. Thus the
judge s spouse is more closely connected to the
matters before the judge than the attorney-in-chief.
1

New York Adv. Comm. on Jud. Ethics Op. 05-87 (Dec. 8, 2005),
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/05-87.htm
[http://perma.cc/PL27-TSZ2].
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For these reasons, we conclude that, because he was in the
direct chain of command between County Attorney and the
attorney prosecuting this case, the Chief Criminal Deputy falls
within the class of persons who can create an appearance of
partiality that requires a judge spouse to, at a minimum, obtain
informed consent from the parties to preside as provided by rule
2.ll(C). In keeping with the majority of jurisdictions, our
holding does not extend to a judge's relationship with attorneys
who merely work in the same public office as the attorney
appearing before the judge. 14 Likewise, our holding does not
exclude the possibility that thoughtful screening procedures in a
public office could sufficiently protect a judge married to a
<jf48

14. Our conclusion that there was an appearance of partiality
here might be different if, for instance, the Juvenile Judge's
spouse was the supervisor of the civil division of the Weber
County Attorney's Office rather than the criminal division. In

that situation, where the prosecuting attorney was part of a
different command hierarchy than the attorney spouse, the
separation between the divisions would likely be a significant
distinction from the circumstances here with regard to questions
concerning a judge's disqualification. Cf Utah Jud. Ethics
Informal Op. No. 94-6, 1995 WL 17935846, at~ (advising that a
judge's marriage to an assistant attorney general did not
automatically require recusal from cases involving a different
assistant attorney general "due to the ... the divisional
organization" of the office, among other reasons like the office's
size and geographic dispersion). But see Utah Jud. Ethics
Informal Op. No. 88-3, 1988 WL 1582480, at *3 (advising that a
judge's marriage to a public defender working at the Legal
Defender Association required recusal "in all cases where LDA
is the attorney of record," regardless of whether the judge's
spouse worked on the individual case, in part because of the
relatively small size of the office which "functions like a private
law office in that case information and strategies are shared
among attorneys").
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prosecutor from the appearance of partiality, but there is no
indication that any were in place here. In any event, as we have
discussed, it is important to err on the side of disclosure when
considering relationships that could give rise to the reasonable
appearance of partiality, and no such disclosure occurred on the
record in this case.
B.

Prejudice Requirement

149 We have concluded that the Juvenile Judge's marriage to
the Chief Criminal Deputy created an appearance of partiality.
But under the unusual circumstances of this case, which reaches
us late in the proceedings after a successful Manning motion,
Van Huizen has already been bound over for trial in the district
court by the Juvenile Judge and convicted as an adult. We
therefore must determine if any remedy is available to Van
Huizen based on the Juvenile Judge's appearance of partiality.
Van Huizen argues that "the appearance of impropriety"
in his case "requires reversal of the bindover order." The State
counters that, even if the Juvenile Judge should have recused
based on her marital relationship with the prosecutor's office,
Van Huizen "has not shown prejudice, as he must." 15 The key
c_i[SO

15. The State asserts that we must conduct a plain error review
on this issue. However, plain error is an exception to the
preservation rule, which generally requires that claims be raised
in the lower court before being raised on appeal. See State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 'Il 11, 10 P.3d 346 (recognizing "plain error"
as an exception to the preservation rule). It is true that the
Juvenile Judge's appearance of partiality was not raised in the
juvenile court. However, it is also true that the preservation rule
assumes that the appealing party had the opportunity to object
in the first instance. Here, the record indicates that Van Huizen
did not have such an opportunity because he did not have
knowledge of the relevant facts at the time of the bindover
(continued ... )
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difference behiveen the two positions-and thus the key to
whether Van Huizen is entitled to relief-turns on the question
of whether a showing of prejudice is necessary for the remedy
sought in this case.
151 Utah law is unsettled on the question· of whether an
appellant must show prejudice when a judge's relationship
constituted an appearance of partiality, with two apparently
diverging approaches. One line of cases imposes a prejudice
requirement on appeal. For instance, our supreme court has held
that "[f]ailure to observe [the recusal standard in the Code of
Judicial Conduct] may subject the judge to disciplinary
measures. However, that does not necessarily mean that the
defendant is entitled to a new trial." State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d
1091, 1094 (Utah 1988). Building on that decision, the court
concluded in State v. Gardner that a judge's failure to recuse, even
(... continued)
decision. Thus, we conclude that plain error i~ not the proper
framework for our review. See In re D.B., 2012 UT 65, <][ 34, 289
P.3d 459 (noting parenthetically that the preservation rule "does
not apply where the question did not exist or could not be raised
below" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, the State's argument implies that a defendant has a
duty to investigate and preserve appearance of partiality issues
in the first instance: Certainly, a defendant must timely raise any
questions of this sort that he is aware of from whatever source.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(l)(B)(iii) (requiring a disqualification
motion to be filed not later than twenty-one days after "the date
on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon
which the motion is based"). But, as we have discussed, it is the
judge's duty to disclose facts relevant to disqualification in the
first instance. In any event, the State's larger point-that some
Utah law supports the proposition that Van Huizen must show
prejudice-is nonetheless accurate, and we address that below.
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in circumstances where he should have done so, was subject to
harmless error analysis. 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989). Later, in
State v. Alonzo, the supreme court reiterated that a judge's
"failure to recuse himself or herself does not automatically
e~title a defendant to a new trial." 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998).
Relying on Gardner for the proposition that "the appearance of
bias may be grounds for reversal if actual prejudice is shown,"
the Alonzo court concluded that "[a]ctual prejudice can be shown
when there exists a reasonable likelihood that the result would
have been more favorable for the defendants absent the trial
judge's appearance of bias." Id. (citing Gardner, 789 P.2d at 278).
cil52 Another case, however, indicates that a prejudice showing
is not always required. In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert,
the supreme court addressed an appearance of impropriety
involving a member of this court. 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992). On
certiorari, the Reichert court addressed a situation where one of
the judges on a panel deciding the case was related through
marriage to two partners at the firm that argued it. Id. at 254. As
with the proceedings at the juvenile level in this case, the Reichert
record contained no suggestion that the related attorneys
"participated in [the] case at any time." Id. at 255. Also like this
case, the petitioner did not "contend[] that [the judge's] failure to
disqualify herself was intentional or malicious." Id. at 255.
Instead, the petitioner simply argued that the "[judge's]
participation create[d] an appearance of impropriety." Id. The
supreme court agreed and, without conducting a prejudice
analysis, "vacate[d] the court of appeals' decision and
remand[ed] to the court of appeals for rehearing of the
substantive issues. Id.
11

153 We believe that the apparent conflict between these
precedents can be reconciled because there are several obvious
differences between this case and the cases that required a
showing of prejudice. First, the procedural posture is different.
Unlike this case, the cases that required showing prejudice
involved situations where the facts constituting the judge's
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alleged appearance of bias where known and brought to the
lower court's attention. E.g., Gardner, 789 P .2d at 278
("Defendant filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice against the
trial judge because he worked in the [court building where the
crime took place]."); Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1093 ("Defendants filed a
pretrial motion to disqualify [the judge] from presiding at their
hfal."); State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(" After these alleged comments were made, defense counsel
filed a motion for the trial judge to recuse himself and submitted
affidavits detailing their versions of the trial judge's
comments."), aff'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). Thus, in instances
where the supreme court has required a showing of prejudice to
grant a new trial, the complaining party had already tried-but
failed-to disqualify the trial judge using appropriate
procedural mechanisms, such as Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29. 16
Cj{54 The supreme court acknowledged the importance of that
point in Neeley when it stated, "absent a showing of actual bias
or an abuse of discretion, failure to [disqualify] does not
constitute reversible error as long as the requirements of [rule

16. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) outlines the process
by which a party may move to disqualify a judge based on "bias
or prejudice, or conflict of interest." The judge against whom the
motion is directed must either grant the motion or certify it to a
reviewing judge for decision. Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2). "If the
reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely
filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing
judge shall assign another judge to the action ...." Id.
R. 29(c)(3)(A). Rule 29 applies in juvenile court. Utah R. Juv. P.
57(e) (incorporating a party's rights under rule 29 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure into the rules of juvenile procedure).
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29] are met." 748 P.2d at 1094-95. 17 See also State 1.J. Onti'oeros, 835
P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992} ("Because the trial judge
precisely followed the provisions of Rule 29, [the appellant]
must show actual bias or an abuse of discretion in order to
prevail on this point."). And in Alonzo, the supreme court
explained that point further. "The trial judge in this case
complied exactly with rule 29. After he had been approved to
continue [with the case], the burden shifted to the petitioners to
show actual bias or abuse of discretion." Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979
(citing Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094-95, and affirming this court's
decision on that point).
155 Based on Alonzo and Neeley, it appears that a failed
attempt to disqualify a trial judge may be a prerequisite to
requiring a showing of prejudice on appeal. As we understand
it, this burden shifting rationale makes sense. In the first
instance, it is the judge's duty to either recuse sua sponte or
disclose the facts that might give rise to an appearance of
partiality. Once the facts have been disclosed, the defendant may
either waive the appearance of partiality or move to disqualify
the judge under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which
imposes a timeliness requirement on the movant. 18 Assuming

17. In Neeley, the procedural mechanism in play was codified at
Utah Code section 77-35-29. However, as this court noted in State
v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), rule 29 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is section 77-35-29's current
analogue.
18. The rule requires the movant to file not later than twenty-one
days after "the date on which the moving party learns or with
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the
grounds upon which the motion is based." Utah R. Crim. P.
29(c)(l)(B)(iii); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(2) (imposing the
same timeliness requirement in civil actions). Optimally, the
(continued ... )
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the defendant timely moves to disqualify the judge, the motion
is either granted or referred to a neutral judge to decide ·the
issue. See supra <JI 53 note 16. Thus, rule 29 is the mechanism by
which defendants may invoke the relevant requirements of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. And hence, when reviewing a case in
which the defendant moved to disqualify the judge, appellate
courts assume that the issue was resolved properly through the
rule 29 process in the first instance. The defendant therefore
bears the extra burden on appeal of showing not just an
appearance of bias, but actual bias.
<J[56 However, that process presumes that the judge disclosed
the facts necessary to support the rule 29 motion in the first place
or that the party learned those facts through some other means.
The case at bar, though, involves an appearance of partiality that
was raised for the first time on appeal because the judge did not
disclose the facts giving rise to the challenge. Van Huizen
therefore had no basis to invoke rule 29, 19 and the reasoning
underlying the imposition of a burden of prejudice on appeal
does not apply here.
157 The second difference between this case and those
requiring a showing of prejudice is found in the judge's degree
of involvement in the ultimate disposition of the case. In State v.
Alonzo, the supreme court affirmed this court's reasoning that a
judge's appearance of partiality was more likely to be harmless
(... continued)
time would begin at the point of the judge's disclosure to the
parties of any relevant relationship.
19. Van Huizen's averment that he was not aware of the
relationship until well after the bindover is uncontradicted in the
record before us, and no one has suggested that his lack of
knowledge was the result of any failure to "exercise ...
reasonable diligence." See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(l)(B)(iii).
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because the "[d]efendants' guilt was determined by a jury and
the judge's [biased] statements were ... not made in the jury's
presence." 973 P.2d 975,, 979-80 (Utah 1998) (original ellipses,,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, both this
court and the supreme court seemed to consider the jury to be an
important intermediary in the decision making process which
shields a criminal defendant from the possible effects of a
judge's partiality. Utah is not alone in taking that position. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
("Moreover, when a defendant is tried by a jury, which exercised
sole responsibility for evaluating the testimony and arriving at a
verdict, the integrity of the fact-finding process is insulated from
any predispositions held by the trial judge."). But see Parenteau v.
Jacobson, 586 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that "a
courtroom has no place for a judge whose impartiality in a
matter may be reasonably questioned, even if he is not the factfinder").
<]l58 In this case, Van Huizen never had the opportunity to
invoke the procedural mechanism that the Alonzo court
determined shifts the burden and requires the appellant "to
show actual bias or abuse of discretion" to prevail on appeal.
Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979. Additionally, the Juvenile Judge acted
alone in Van Huizen' s bindover hearing, making both factual
and legal determinations in arriving at a decision that is both fact
sensitive and highly discretionary; there was no jury to insulate
the bindover decision from the appearance of partiality. See id. at
979-80.

For these reasons, we conclude that this case is dissimilar
to the Alonzo line of cases that require a prejudice showing. This
case is similar, however, to Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert,
which did not impose a prejudice requirement. In this case, as in
Reichert, the facts constituting the appearance of partiality were
not disclosed by the judge below and there was no jury to
insulate the process from the potential effects emanating from
the appearance of partiality. 830 P.2d 252, 257-58 (Utah 1992).

'1[59
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Thus, we conclude that Van Huizen is entitled to relief without
showing prejudice on the basis that the Juvenile Judge's
marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy created an appearance of
partiality that went undisclosed and thus unaddressed below.
CJI60 Other courts have reached a similar conclusion. For
example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court "decline[d] to
implement a harmless error test when evaluating violations of
the code [of judicial ethics] by the members of the New
Hampshire bench" because "it would be inconsistent with the
goals of our code to require certain standards of behavior from
the judiciary in the interest of avoiding the appearance of
partiality, but then to allow a judge's ruling to stand when those
standards have been violated." Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609
A.2d 388, 391 (N.H. 1992); see also Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d
745, 751 (D.C. 1989) (en bane) ("Furthermore, a defendant is not
required to show prejudice from a violation of the standard set
by [the code of conduct] as would affect the outcome of the trial
in order to be entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.");
State v. Smith, 635 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (" Although
in the instant case there was no motion to recuse [the judge], we
believe that the interests of justice and the avoidance of
impropriety require a reversal of sentence and a remand for
resentencing.").
<JI:61 And in Velardo v. Ovitt, the Vermont Supreme Court
addressed circumstances similar to those here. 2007 VT 69, 933
A.2d 227. In Velardo, a party claimed that the trial judge should
have recused due to an appearance of partiality that was not
identified until after trial in a child custody dispute. Id. en 1. After
determining that the complicated circumstances created the
appearance of partiality, the court turned to the question of
remedy and determined that a split of authority exists on
whether vacatur is warranted absent a showing of prejudice. Id.
<JI<JI 12, 23-28. The court stated:
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We reject the North Dakota Supreme Court's
holding that orders of a judge who creates an
appearance of impropriety cannot be set aside
unless there is a showing of actual bias or
prejudice. On this point, we agree with the New
Hampshire Supreme Court that such a rule would
be inconsistent with the goals of our code to
require certain standards of behavior from the
judiciary in the interest of avoiding the appearance
of partiality, but then to allow a judge's ruling to
stand when those standards have been violated.
On the other hand, we believe that [the New
Hampshire Supreme Court's] holding that a
judge's failure to disqualify can never be harmless
goes too far.

Id. <JI 28 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Velardo court therefore took a middle ground and imported a
federal balancing test to determine on a case by case basis
whether vacatur is a proper remedy. While we do not adopt the
Vermont balancing test, that approach confirms and reinforces
the analytical approach that we have identified in our own
precedent.
For instance, as in our case, the Velardo court noted that
the judge "had actual knowledge of the source of the conflict"
and "an independent duty to disclose the relationship that
created the conflict." Id. <fl 29. The court also noted that the
decision below was a "very difficult ... case," id. <]131 (internal
quotation marks omitted), a factor similar to the situation here,
where the Juvenile Judge's decision was apparently a close callshe found by the high standard of clear and convincing evidence
that one of the two statutory factors favored Van Huizen's
retention in juvenile court. Thus, we agree with the Velardo court
that, because "the result was not easily reached," "[t]he
appearance of influence, therefore, [was] significant." See id.
Finally, the court pointed out that, "because we afford such wide

<]162
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discretion to the family court, we cannot determine with any
precision the influence of partiality, if any." Id. Without
question, juvenile courts in Utah are similarly afforded "broad
discretion regarding judgments, based on the juvenile court's
specialized experience and training," In re J.R., 2011 UT App 180,
'Il 2, 257 P.3d 1043 (per curiam), which serves to both obscure the
effects of partiality and potentially amplify the consequences.
For these reasons, the Vermont Supreme Court's analysis
supports our own conclusion that a showing of prejudice or
actual bias on appeal is not required in this case.
C.

Remedy

'}I63 We conclude that Van Huizen is entitled to a new
bindover hearing because the Juvenile Judge's spousal
relationship with the Chief Criminal Deputy created an
appearance of partiality in the original bindover proceeding.
Because the Juvenile Judge did not disclose her relationship, Van
Huizen did not have the opportunity to move for
disqualification under Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which
allows a party to challenge the impartiality of a judge in a
juvenile case. See supra <j[ 53 note 16. Thus, Van Huizen never
invoked the procedural mechanism that in other cases has been a
factor in requiring a showing of prejudice to succeed on a claim
of appearance of judicial partiality on appeal. See State v. Alonzo,
973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998) (indicating that a failed attempt to
disqualify a judge is a prerequisite for requiring a party "to show
actual bias or abuse of discretion" on appeal). Further, the
bindover decision here was solely within the realm of the
Juvenile Judge's discretion, with no independent decision maker
such as a jury to attenuate the potential effects of any partiality.
See id. at 979-80 (indicating that a jury helps insulate a judge
from the effects of an appearance of partiality).
<_[64 We therefore conclude that Van Huizen is not required to
show prejudice to prevail on appeal under these circumstances.
In a situation like this, where the relevant information was
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neither disclosed by the judge nor known to Van Huizen at the
time of his bindover hearing, the appearance of partiality is
enough to require a new hearing. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v.
Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 254, 257-58 (Utah 1992) (remanding for
new proceedings without conducting a prejudice analysis in
circumstances where the facts giving rise to an appearance of
partiality were not previously known).
CONCLUSION
<JI65

Based on the analysis set forth above, we vacate the
juvenile court's bindover order and remand the issue for a new
hearing before a different judge. If Van Huizen is bound over to
district court, the results of his district court proceeding will
remain undisturbed. If Van Huizen is not bound over, his
convictions in the district court shall be vacated.
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT

FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER ON BIND OVER

vs.

COOPER VAN HUIZEN,
Defendant.

Case Number: 1003447
Judge: Michelle E Heward

This matter came before the court for a preliminary hearing/examination and a
subsequentbest·interest hearing, on December 20, 2013. The State was present and represented
by Brody E. Flint, Qeputy Weber County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented
by his attorney, .Rex Bray; co-defendant Josh Parley Dutson was present and represented by
counsel, Mary Ann Ellis. The Court heard evidence from all parties and being fully apprised,
now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The State met its burden and the court finds probable cause to believe that the

~es listed in the Information, two aggravated robberies and one aggravated burglary, occurred

as alleged.
2.

Further, there is probable cause to believe that Cooper Van Huizen committed the

offenses alleged in the Information.

3.

The Defendant has no prior record in the juvenile court.

FILED
JAN 2120;~
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Case No. 1003447
Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law & Order on Bind Over
Page2

4.

These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court therefore

considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other co-defendants, and

finds that his culpability was significant.
a.

Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than

others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and assisted
in the forced entrance into the home with co.defendants.
b.

Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies.

Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies.

c.

Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other co-

defendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the persons
therein.

5.

Mr. Van Huizen' s role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or

premeditated manner.
a.

These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The

guns. belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in the

burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not ~ spur

of the moment decision.
b.

Mr. Van Huizen was with co-defendants who forced their way at gun

point into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home.
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c.

The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's

planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen lmew that the guns were intended to be used
in a burglary and robbery for drugs.
d.

Mr. Van Huizen' s presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the

victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home.

6.

This is Mr. Van Huizen's first offense injuvenile court.

7.

Public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the district court.
a.

Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited

until the age of21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited.
b.

The involvement of drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a

home to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our
community.
c.

The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case.

People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when they
occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead to even
fatal harm to law enforcement and other members of the public.
d.

Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period

than is available in the.juvenile court.

e.

The defense provided evidence of a loving family and good home. The

court finds that will help the Defendant in terms of his long tenn rehabilitation, but it also
works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to engage in
violent and inesponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public at grave risk.
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8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the

best interest of the Defendant to bind him over to the jurisdiction of the district court.
9.

The defense has not shown, however, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is

in the best interest of the public for this case to be adjudicated injuvenile court The court finds

that it

is contrary to the best interests of the public to allow the case to remain in juvenile court.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER
The Defendant should be and hereby is bound over to the district court for further

proceedings on the Information.

DATED

An arrest warrant has issued and bail has been set.

thisL day of January, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
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interest of the public to bind the defendants over to the

2

jurisdiction of the district court .

3

•

4

that is clear for both of the defendants individually and not

5

placing them together.

6

questions with regard to the findings as I go through here that

7

you ask questions if I'm not clear with regard to each of your

8

clients and to the State ' s interest so that I can make sure that

9

that record is clear, and I ' ll attempt to do that.

10

•
•
•

•
•

•

The Court wants to make sure that I ' m making a record

Counsel, I ' ll ask if there are any

. The Court has considered the five statutory factors that

11

are set forth in 78A- 6- 702(3) (c).

12

stipulation has been found to go in favor of each of the

13

defendants .

14

juvenile court that are of any signifi cance here .

15

The first of those factors by

Neither one of them have prior records here in the

The second factor is whether the offenses were committed

16

with one or more persons -- I'm sor ry, these offenses were

17

committed with one or more persons , so the Court considers

18

whether each of the minor ' s involvement , whether each of them

19

had a greater or lesser degree of culpability than their co-

20

defendants .

21

With regard to Mr. JPD, the Court finds that his role

22

in carrying out the offenses was one of planning and pulling

23

people together .

24

culpability of Mr . JPD both before and during the actual offense

25

shows that he had culpability .

The evidence before the Court shows that the
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He was involved in acquiring guns prior

2

with the knowledge that they would be used in the robbery.

3

was in a place to use those weapons to gain entry.

4

he was in on the plan to use the weapons to gain entry into the

5

home, and to take what he and his co-defendants wanted from the

6

people within the home.

7

•

He

I ' m sorry,

•

While the Court does not find that he pointed a gun at

8

either of the victims -- I.'m just not sure what happened there - -

9

but I do find that .that was done by two of the -- the two adults

10

that were involved.

11

culpability in insuring that t hat would happen , that the people

12

that he was with would pull guns and use them after breaking into

13

the home.

14

Mr. JPD ' s involvement had a high degree of

With regard to Mr. CVH, the Court finds that his

15

involvement was less in terms of his physical involvement at the

16

scene.

17

have insufficient evidence to determine whether he had a

18

switch - - the switchblade that had been referred to by others

19

that have testified here today .

I don't have evidence that he brandished a gun, and I

20

His involvement was in planning and facilitating , the

•

21

offenses.

22

Mr . JPD' s .

23

planned out in terms of how the guns would be used.

24

of the second factor, the Court finds that the involvement of

25

each of the -- each of these defendants was significant in terms

•
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His involvement was actually greater than that of
These were his guns from his home, and this was well
So in terms

•
-134 -

e

1

of the offenses .

2

•
•

3

the rn1nor ' s role in -- was it committed in a violent, aggressive

4

or premeditated manner .

5

been

6

spur of the moment , a dumb or a childish decision , a quick

7

reaction.

8

robberies and the burglary.

9

•

•

•

•
•

The premeditation in these offenses has

already been referred to by the Court.

This was not a

Both defendants were involved in planning the

There were multiple steps t hat were carried out prior to

10

actually going out to the home.

11

time, giving both of the defendants ample opportunity to retract

12

themselves from the offenses , but they chose not t o do so.

13

were violent and aggressive offenses with the use of guns and

14

threats, going inside one of the most protected and sacred places

15

in our society, the home.

16

•

Whether the role -- the third factor as the extent of

This took place over a period of

These

The violence that was employed, albeit by others in

17

terms of pulling the guns, was made possible by Mr. CVH and

18

facilitated by Mr. JPD.

19

Mr. CVH and the planning or pulling together of the parties and

20

facilitation by Mr . JPD, they both -- both of these defendants

21

forced their way into a home with the assistance of friends

22

that they were with who were using guns , and their physical

23

presence -- I'm talking about the defendant's physical presence

24

was a threat when the offense took place .

25

the roles of both JPD and CVH to have been involved involved

In addition to providing the guns by

The Court finds that
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2

violence, aggression and were premeditated .
The number and nature - - the next factor is the number

3

and nature of prior adjudications in the juvenile court.

4

Court finds that those again go i n favor of the defendants here.

5

They do not have violent - - or they do not have records of any

6

significance here in the juvenile court.

7

The

The fifth factor is whether public safety is better

8

served by adjudicating the minors in the juvenile court or in the

9

district court.

The Court believes that public safety would be

10

better served in both of these cases by adjudicating them in the

11

district court.

12

They are older juveniles, 16 and 17-years of age .

13

The extent of the juvenile court ' s involvement is limited until

14

the age -- is limited to the age of 21.

15

jurisdiction is not limited.

16

the involvement of drugs, violence , particularly the use of

17

firearms and forcibly entering into a home where people therein

18

were robbed places the offense amongst the most serious in our

19

community.

20

when given the facts of this case.

21

strongly protected against this activity.

22

The district court's

While these were first offenses,

The likelihood of further injury and harm is great
Society deserves to be

The Court does find that the defense has shown that it

23

is contrary to the best interest of the minors to bind them over

24

to the jurisdiction of the district court.

25

rehabilitative services that are available in the juvenile system

There are more
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than in the adult system.

2

defendants appear to have loving families and homes that they

3

have come from .

4

succeed, and they have skill sets that show that they have many

5

capabilities .

6

nor the positive skill sets that I think both of them have, they

7

chose not to use those in· this situation.

8
9

•

•
•
•
•

•

Both of the minors , both of the

They have had opportunities in the past to

They chose not to use those.

Either the support

So the Court finds that the defense has not met its
burden of proving that it is contrary to the best interest of the

10

minor and the best interest of the ptiblic to bind the defendants

11

over to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

12

that I've said that right .

13

of proving it is contrary to the minor ' s best interest , neither

14

defense has met its burden of showing that it's in the best

15

interest of the public in this inter

16

matter is bound over to the district court.

17

Let me make sure

While the defense has met the burden

in this instance , and the •

On a personal note, this is not the way that I would

18

want any young man to start his majority with serious offenses

19

in the adult system.

20

your actions , but I also think that it ' s necessary -- that

21

accountability is necessary.

22

in front of you, and it is the Court ' s hope that you use this

23

experience to do -- make better decisions and choices in the

24

future as you move forward .

25

It ' s tough to be held accountable for

You still both have a lot of years

That being said, I need arrest warrants here.

Does the
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

OMNIBUS RULING AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
POST-SENTENCE MOTIONs\UG 2 9 2014

vs.

Case No. 131902Si....,.2_ _ _ _ _ __

COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN
HUIZEN.

Judge Ernie W. JoJJes

Defendant.

t=ILED

I

~

AUG 2 2Dt't

I

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's several post-sentence
motions. In order, Defendant has presented the Court with the following motions:
1) the "Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel"; 2) the "Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious
Youth Offender Bindover Order"; 3) the ''Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify
Pleas"; 4) the "Motion to Quash Bindover Order from Juvenile Court"; and 5) a
"Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal" combined with an "Application for

Certificate of Probable Cause." Counsel for both the State and Defendant have
fully briefed these motions and the Court has carefully considered the arguments
and law cited therein. In the interest of judicial efficiency, and as these motions
touch on similar themes and legal questions, the Court will address these motions
in this single omnibus ruling and order.
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BACKGROUND

Defendant, following his participation in a violent home invasion, was
charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated
burglary. Defendant, a-16-year-old minor, was then bound over from juvenile court
to this Court to face the charges as an adult. The bind over process was conducted
in accordance with the Juvenile Court Act, specifically its provisions relating to
serious youth offenders See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. In March of this year,
Defendant entered guilty pleas to two reduced, second-degree felony robbery
charges. On May 7, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 1- to 15year terms in the Utah State Prison.
Defendant, by raising several alleged deficiencies, now seeks to challenge

~e p!ocess by which Defendant was bound over into district court from juvenile
court; entered his plea of guilty, and a sentence was imposed. In deciding these
motions, the Court will address each motion according to its chronological relation

t<? Defendant's proceedings, rather than in the order that Defendant filed the
motion with the Court. Following the Court's analysis and ruling, the Court will
specify its respective orders.

ANALYSIS
I.

Motion to Quash Bind Over Order from Juvenile Court
First, the Court addresses Defendant's motion to quash the bind over order

from juvenile court. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by several alleged
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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legal

and structural errors that occw-red during the process by which the juvenile

court bound him over to this Court. The statutory mechanisms establishing this
bind over process are outlined below.
The Juvenile Court Act, specifically in its provisions relating to transferring
serious you~ offenders to district court, provides that juveniles may be bound over
.,

· and held to answer to as adults in district court if the criminal information filed
against those juveniles charges them with certain types of violent offenses. See
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. This process is not automatic and is subject to the
state meeting its burden to establish probable cause that that the violent offense has
been committed and that the juvenile defendant committed said violent offense.
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3). If the state met this burden, the juvenile court
"shall order that the defendant be bound over [to the district court] ... unless the
juvenile court judge finds that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor

and to the public ...." Id.
The factors that a juvenile court judge may rely upon in making the
determination to bind over the defendant are very specific, and the Juvenile Court
Act provides that a juvenile defendant may appeal a bind over order. See Utah

Code Ann. 78A-6-702{3)(c), 78A-6-704(a). On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals
then reviews the bind over order and the "underlying factual findings made by the
juvenile judge" for "clear error" in order to determine whether to affirm or reverse
the bind over order. State ex rel. M.E.P., 114 P.3d 596,598 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
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This process illustrates that it is only the appellate court that is vested with
the authority to consider and potentially quash juvenile bind over orders.
Defendant has offered sundry argwnents as to why this Court should quash the
bind over order, but such arguments to this Court are unavailing, as it possesses no
jurisdiction to issue the particular relief sought Only the appellate court may
consider these arguments and order the bind over order quashed if that court
determines that such action is appropriate. For lack of jurisdiction, this Court

cannot grant such a motion.
II.

Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover
Order
The Court now turns to Defendant's motion to reinstate the timeframe to

appeal the bind over order. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the failure
of then-serving counsel to timely file an appeal of the bind over order and the
failure of same counsel to inform Defendant of the availability of such an appeal.

Defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Manning in support of the
proposition that it is appropriate to reinstate appellate time when appeals of right
are defaulted by counsel and through no fault of the defendant. See State v.
Manning, 122 P .3d 628, 636 (Utah 2005). •The State agreed in its opposing

m~morandum that under Manning, Defendant should have his time to appeal the
bind over order reinstated.
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Defonciant 's 1; ost-Sentence Motions
·

Manning provides that it is appropriate to reinstate a Defendant's direct
appeal right.if it can be determined that the defendant "been prevented in some
meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of right." Id. at 63 S. One of
the outlined circumstances of Manning leading to reinstatement of the direct appeal
right is that the defendant can demonstrate that ''the court or the defendant's
attorney failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal." Id. While the
State points out that the juvenile court bind over order clearly specified the 30-day
right to appeal that order, Defendant maintains that his counsel neither informed
the Defendant of this fact nor provided the Defendant with a copy of the bind over
order.
Normally a gUilty plea, such as Defendant's here, would serve as a waiver of
(j.

any alleged procedural defects with the bind over. See State v. Rhinehart, 167 P .3d
1046, 1049 (Utah 2007). However, our Supreme Court has specified that this
~

waiver does apply to alleged errors of a jurisdictional nature. Id. Here, had
Defendant timely appealed the bind over order, he would have been challenging
the decision of the juvenile court to confer jwisdiction over the Defendant to this
Court. This question, combined with the fact that Defendant has offered evidence

supporting the application of the Manning circumstances (namely that counsel
failed to advise Defendant of his right to· appeal and failed to provide him with the
juvenile court order specifying the available reliet) leads the Court to conclude that
reinstating Defendant's time to appeal the bind over order is appropriate.
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The Court, however, must stress that granting Defendant's motion here does
not affect Defendant's present incarceration, as the Court's decision cannot unwind
all proceedings post-bind over order. When this Court heard the case, accepted the

plea, and announced a sentence, it did so with the understanding that it held proper
jurisdiction via bind over order. Barring an appellate court decision as to the
validity of that bind over order and its effect on this Court's sentence, the Court
lacks the authority to stay the sentence in conjunction with reinstating the time to
appeal the bind over order. The appropriate procedural mechanism to stay a

•

sentence pending appeal is found in Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. As mentioned in the outset of this ruling, Defendant has made a motion
invoking that rule, and the Court will address the merits of that motion later in this
ruling.

m. Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify Pleas
Next the Court addresses Defendant's motion that this Court recognize
Defendant's guilty pleas as mispleas or alternatively to nullify those guilty pleas.
Defendant asserts that this Court retains the authority to declare a misplea here or
to nullify his pleas because the guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary~ While
it is true that a trial court may withdraw a plea of guilty upon a showing that the

plea

was not knowingly or voluntarily made, such motions must be made prior to

the announcement of sentence. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a)-(b). Any

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-~.-591

•

Omnibus Ruling and Order on DefendanCs Post-Sentence Motions
Civil No. 131902S42
Page 7 of 13

challenge to a guilty plea "not made within the [specified] time period" can only be
pursued via request for post-conviction relief. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(c).
Here, the Court has announced its sentence regarding the Defendant's
conviction. Accordingly, the Court possesses neither the authority to hear such a
motion nor the ability to grant the requested remedy. Defendant's arguments

•

regarding knowledge, volition, and their relation to his guilty pleas may only be
offered in a separate, civil petition for post-conviction relief. The Court therefore

cannot grant this motion.
IV.

Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result oflneffe.ctive
Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also moves this Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal

Procedure 22(e), to correct Defendant's sentence on the basis that the sentence was
illegal. In support of this motion, Defendant offers that the sentence was illegal
due to trial counsel's ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. Specifically,
Defendant argues that the assistance was ineffective because trial counsel failed at
the sentencing hearing to distinguish Defendant's culpability from that of his codefendants', and failed to provide the Court (for purposes of presentence reporting)
with information that Defendant alleges was essential to consider. -Despite
Defendant's strenuous argument, ineffective assistance of counsel does not serve

as grounds for declaring a sentence illegal.
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Regarding illegal sentences, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the
definition promulgated by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. State v. Yazzie, 203
P.3d 984, 988 (Utah 2009). Under that definition, a sentence is illegal if it "is
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is

•

internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is

uncertain ~ to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment
of conviction did not authorize." United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515
(10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the State points out, a
sentence is also illegal if the imposing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. State
v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 854,857 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).

As the Court cannot consider Defendant's arguments of ineffective
assistance of counsel as a proper basis for declaring the sentence here illegal, it
must determine whether the any of the aforementioned, recognized grounds apply.

The Court determines that they do not. Defendant pied guilty to two ~ounts of
robbery. Robbery is classified under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 as a second..
degree felony. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203, the appropriate
sentence that may be levied against a person convicted of a second degree felony is
an indeterminate term of imprisonment "not less than one year nor more than 15

years." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(2). Defendant's sentence here was not
ambiguous with resp~ct to time or manner. It was not internally contradictory. It
did not omit a required term imposed by statute. It was not uncertain as to the
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substance of the sentence. It was precisely the sort of sentence authorized by the
conviction of a second-degree felony. As previously established, the Court had
jurisdiction subsequent to the issuance of the bind over order from juvenile court.
None of the established grounds that would render-a sentence illegal and require
correction under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exist here.
Accordingly, the Court can find no basis to properly grant Defendant's motion.
V.

Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal and Issue a Certificate of
Probable Cause
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant's petition for a certificate of probable

cause motion to his Motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. In order to release

a currently incarcerated defendant during the pendency of his appeal, Rule 27 of
i>

the Utah Rule of Criminal· Procedure requires that that this Court first issue a
certificate of probable cause and determine by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant is not likely to flee and does not pose a danger to the community.
Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b)(l). In order to properly issue a certificate of probable

cause, the Court must find that the Defendant's appeal is not taken for the purpose
of delay and raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in
reversal. Id. at (b)(3).

Out of the myriad arguments Defendant has made, the Court has recognized

only one as cogniz.ant: that the Defendant may appeal the juvenile Court bind over
order due to the failure of trial counsel to apprise him of his right to appeal the
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order. However, this Court is not convinced by Defendant's arguments that it is
reasonably likely that the Court of Appeals will quash the bind over order.
Furthermore, on the basis of the clearly delineated jurisprudence that informs the
Court's analysis of Defendant's other motions, the Court is not convinced that
Defendant~ raised any substantial issues of law and fact that make it reasonably
likely that the Court of Appeals will overturn the Court's other determinations.
Specifically as to the bind over order, Defendant's argument challenges the
juvenile court judge's qualifications to hear his case and only collaterally attacks
the juvenile court's consideration of the five factors that must be analyzed when
deciding to bind over a defendant to district court. As stated previously, the
statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-6-702(3)(c) require that juvenile
..,

court judges only consider five specific factors when making bind over
determinations. Nothing in Defendant's arguments suggests that the juvenile court
deviated from those factors and none of Defendant's proffered alternative
conclusions to each of those factors is legally or factually s_ignificant enough to call
the court's decision into question.
Furthermore, this Court is not convinced that Defendant's arguments
regarding the juvenile court judge (specifically her personal and professional
background) raise an issue of fact or law significant enough to make reversal of the
bind over reasonably certain. As the Court can find no adequate ground on this
issue, or as to the arguments supporting Defendant's other post-sentence motions,
r.•
. "°\
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that would warrant the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, the Court will
refrain from issuing such a certificate.
Even if the Court were to find a basis to issue the certificate of probable
cause, the circumstances forming the basis of Defendant's conviction demonstrate
that it is not in the community's best interest to release him from incarceration.
The Defendant is serving his current sentence because he pled guilty to robbery-a
robbery accomplished through home invasion and through Defendant's provision
of firearms. These are actions and the sort of behavior that can only be
characterized as absolutely contrary to the societal interests of peace and safety.
Defendant's age does not mitigate the gravity of these actions. Indeed, the
severity of his behavior warranted charging him in district court as an adult It
would be antithetical to the interests-even safety-of the comm.unity to suspend
the operation of his sentence. Absent grounds to issue a certificate of probable
cause, and in light of the circumstances of the offense, the Court is not convinced
that it is appropriate to release defendant from incarceration.

ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing rulings, Defendant's Motion to Reinstate

Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover Order is GRANTED. All other
motions captioned and discussed herein are hereby DENIED. In accordance with
granting Defendant's Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth
Bindover Order, the 30-day period to appeal the bind over order is reinstated.
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Pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, any such appeal of
that bind over order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of this Order.
Dated this 2 ~ day of

,A ~ q\ vt,T2014.

~
tl,...__..--Judge Ernie W. Jones \
Utah Second District Court

•
•
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

l:fff!•day of ~

2014, I sent a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ruling to the parties as follows:
Dee W. Smith ·
Brody E. Flint
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Weber County Attorney's Office
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230
Ogden, Utah 84401

Elizabeth Hunt
Attorney. for Defendant
Eliz.abeth Hunt LLC
S69 Browning Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 5 - House Bill 105

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Enrolled Copy

H.B.105

1

SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER AMENDl\iENTS

2

2013 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

Chief Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow

5

Senate Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard

6
7

LONGTITLE

8

Gene~al Description:

9

This bill amends the procedure to transfer jurisdiction for a serious youth offender from

10

a juvenile court to a district court.

11

ffighlighted Provisions:

12

This bill:

13

•

provides for a juvenile court judge to consider a minor's prior adjudications in

14

juvenile court, a minor's best interest, and the public's safety when determining a

15

jurisdiction transfer from a juvenile court to a district court; and

16

l~
18

•

makes technical changes.

Money Appropriated in this Bill:
None

·,·

19

20

Other Special Clauses:
None

2t

Utah Code Sections Affected:

22

AMENDS:

23

78A-6-702, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2012, Chapter 118

24

25

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

26

Section 1. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read:

27

78A-6-702. Serious youth offender -- Procedure.

28

(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging

29

a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the
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juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses:

31

(a) any felony violation of:

32

(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;

33

(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another;

34

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [kidnapirtg] kidnapping:

35

(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;

36

(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

37

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;

38

(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm;

39

(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or

40

(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or

41

(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a

42

dangerous weapon.s. which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been

43

previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon1

44

which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult.

45
46

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection
(1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court.

47

(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the

48

state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish

49

probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed

50

and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1 )(b), the state shall have

51

the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has

52

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

53

weapon.

54

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection

55

(3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district

56

court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that [all of the

57

follorwing conditions exist.] it would be contra:cy to the best interest of the minor and to the
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public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the district court.

59
60

(c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge shall consider
only the following:
(i) whether the minor has [not] been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense

61
62

involving the use of a dangerous we~pon which would be a felony if committed by an adult;

63

(ii) [that] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the

64

minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; [and]
(iii) [that] the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was [not] committed in a

65

66

violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:]_;_

67

(iv} the number and nature of Ole minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and

68

(v} whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the juvenile

69

court or in the district court.

70
'1/ib

H.B.105

[(tj-] .@. Once the state has met its burden under [this'] Subsection (3).W. as to a

71

showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and

72

presenting evidence [as bJ the existence of the above conditiorxs] that in light of the

73

considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c), it would be contraty to the best interest of the minor

74

and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district

75

court.

76

[~] fu)_ If the juvenile courtjudge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [aH-the

77

above conditions me satisfied,] it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the

78

best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the

79

court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed

80

upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

81

(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the

82

state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over

83

under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor

84

and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

85

(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue.
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86

The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be

87

advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in

88

accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.

89

(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section,

90

the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of

91

probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant

92

committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the

93

additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b).

94
95

(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more

96 . charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any
97

subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with

98

those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been

99

committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to

100
101

the district court to answer for those charges.
(8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the

102

jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is

103

terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode,

104

and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in

105

Subsection (12).

106

(9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this

107

section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a

108

preliminary examination in the district court.

109

(10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has

110

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

111

weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need

112

to be proven at trial in the district court.

113

(11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any
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114

other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over

115

the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

116

(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice

117

Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there

118

is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on unspecified dates)

3

CHAIRMAN:

With that,

our first item on the agenda will

4

be House Bill, Representative Snow.

5

time is yours.

6

MR. SNOW:

Representative Snow, the

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

7

committee.

8

the State of Utah whereby we can or the court -- juvenile court

9

can in certain cases involving a juvenile offender certify that

The bill before you, HB105 relates to the process in

10

juvenile to the district court to stand trial as an adult, and of

11

course if found guilty, to be sentenced as an adult.

12

This amendment relates to that process.

The current

13

code provision is fairly restrictive into how -- as to how that

14

process works.

15

juvenile offenders that are 16 years of age or older.

16

the way that it proceeds is once criminal information is filed

17

for one of the offenses that are listed that are subject to being

18

certified as an adult, the Court holds a probable cause hearing,

19

essentially to determine whether or not there's probable cause to

20

believe that the offender has committed one of those offenses,

21

and then also as part of that, to determine whether or not the

22

juvenile offender was

23

system and has committed an offense using a dangerous weapon.

24
25

First of all,

the process only applies to
Secondly,

has previously been in the juvenile

If those burdens are met,

then the Court under the

current statutory scheme goes through a fairly narrow process in
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1

determining whether or not this offender ought to be certified as

2

an adult.

3

clear and convincing evidence, and the Court looks -- under the

4

current statute the Court looks at three elements: whether or not

5

this offender was previously adjudicated for an offense involving

6

a dangerous weapon, whether or not if it was that the activity

7

involved one or more co-defendants, whether or not this

8

particular minor's culpability was less than the others, and

9

whether or not there were elements of aggravated nature, a

10
11

The standard of evidence in that determination is by

violent element, aggressive or premeditated element.
Once those are met under our current code, the juvenile

12

court judge really has no discretion.

13

the way the law is written, he or she sitting as the judge must

14

certify that offender to district court, and then the offender

15

goes through adult court to face those charges.

16

there are some crimes that are so egregious and heinous in their

17

nature and by their facts that this was the reason this provision

18

exists in the code.

19

Once those are met, then

Now clearly

Now the purpose of the amendment is to keep that process

20

and that procedure in place, but to add an element of discretion

21

or a greater element of discretion in those cases where,

22

according to the amendment, it would be in the best interest

23

of the minor and the public to bind the defendant over to the

24

jurisdiction of the court -- of the district court, but must meet

25

in addition to the three elements that I've indicate.
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The Court would also have a right to look at the nature

2

and number of the prior adjudicated offenses, and also an overall

3

determination analysis, is the public safety better served by

4

adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the district

5

court.

6

Seated to my right, I should -- Mr. Chairman, members of

7

the committee, I think most of you know Director Jacey Skinner,

8

who is the director for the Utah Sentencing Commission.

9

take questions on the amendment, if it's okay, Mr. Chairman, I'd

Before I

10

like to turn some time to Director Skinner to provide the

11

committee with a little more context and history as to how this

12

came about, this amendment, what the genesis was for it and why

13

the director and her board believes that this is a proper

14

amendment for the committee to consider and eventually be passed

15

into law.

16

17
18

Is that acceptable?
CHAIRMAN:

That would great.

Ms. Skinner, if you'll

just introduce yourself.
MS. SKINNER:

My name is Jacey Skinner.

As mentioned,

19

I'm the director of the Utah Sentencing Commission.

20

started, I just wanted to thank you Representative Snow for his

21

help with this particular bill.

22

helpful in helping us move those forward.

23

As was mentioned, this

24

serious youth offender statute.

25

history, I've provided a chart there.

Before I get

He's been very dedicated and

--

this bill deals with our

To give you a little bit of
You should all have one.
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1

It's entitled Utah Juvenile Transfer and Custody Laws.

2

explains the different methods by which we currently under our

3

current law transfer juveniles from the juvenile court to the

4

criminal system or the adult system.

5

It

There are three methods.

There is one which we call just statutory jurisdiction

6

or where it's by -- by law, the crime is automatically filed in a

7

criminal court.

8

the minor is 16 years of age or older and commits an offense that

9

would me murder, aggravated murder.

These cases are fairly narrow, but they're when

Those offenses are filed

10

directly there, and there's no question there.

11

previously been transferred to the adult court -- to criminal

12

court -- any case after that point is filed in that particular

13

area.

Or if they've

14

We also have a process called certification which is

15

more of a discretionary waiver where it doesn't fall into any

16

particular type of crime, but if the prosecutor feels like

17

transfer may be warranted, they can file an information and put

18

on a certification hearing for the judge where the judge has a

19

lot of discretion to determine whether or not it's in the

20

interest of the public or in the interest of the juvenile to

21

transfer them to juvenile court.

22

Then we have in the middle what we call a presumptive

23

waiver type of a situation where

24

we're focusing on today which is called serious youth offender.

25

It's a presumptive waiver which means that for a violation of any

and this is the statute that
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of the crimes that you see listed there, that it's presumed that

2

the juvenile will be transferred.

3

mentioned, the factors that exist that the Court has to find are

4

quite narrow and very well defined.

5

the Court is asked to find -- to hold a retention factor hearing

6

in which they are asked to find some of the following

7

circumstances.

8

they must find that all of the circumstances exist, and they're

9

kind of negative findings,

10

Now as Mr. Representative Snow

After preliminary hearing

It's a little awkward to follow because it's --

so I'll walk you through them.

So they -- the Court must find that the minor has not

11

been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving a

12

dangerous weapon.

13

committed with one or more other persons, the minor appears to

14

have a lesser degree of culpability than the co-defendants, and

15

that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a

16

violent, aggressive or premeditated manner.

17

They must also find that if the offense is

Because the Court must find all of these to exist, it's

18

really difficult for them to ever retain a juvenile.

19

give the appearance that the judges have some discretion here and

20

that they're making a decision, really, given the nature of these

21

offenses -- and these are serious offenses.

22

mean to lessen the degree of their seriousness at all.

23

So while we

I don't -- I don't

For instance, an aggravated burglary, it's very

24

difficult to commit an aggravated burglary in a non-aggressive

25

manner.

So by the very nature that the Court has found that the
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1

probable cause exists, even if the minor has not been previously

2

adjudicated delinquent for a weapon, even if there

3

was committed in concert with more than one person and their role

4

in the crime was very minor, the fact that the crime itself was

5

aggressive means that the Court has to bind them over.

6

the offense

I became the director of this commission about four

7

years ago, and one of the very first things that my commission

8

started saying that they wanted to look at was this particular

9

statute for that reason.

All mem -- everyone involved felt

10

like their hands were kind of tied.

11

cases -- or the law says that these cases must be filed this

12

way, and the juvenile court judges have really no discretion in

13

deciding whether or not this juvenile should be transferred.

14

The Court said that these

The reason that this is frustrating for them is that

15

they really may have a juvenile who has no previous history

16

whatsoever; this is their first interaction with the juvenile

17

court.

18

of the nature of the crime, they are -- they're transferred to

19

the district court system.

Their role may have been a minor one.

20

But again, because

The prosecutors don't always think that that should be

21

the case.

22

should be the case, and the judges are often frustrated that they

23

are forced, because of the way the law is written, to transfer

24

them.

25

The defense attorneys obviously don't think that that

What happens when they are then transferred into the
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district court is where we -- we're giving them these harsh adult

2

sentences, is given the fact that they are very young, that they

3

have no criminal history and that their role in the offense

4

was -- may have been rather minor, we often see them being placed

5

on probation, which is not really the purpose of sending someone

6

to district court.

7

If we think about why we would be transferring someone

8

to the adult court from the juvenile court, I think there are

9

two questions that we have to ask.

First, is the harsher adult

10

sentence needed.

11

a length and duration longer than we would have jurisdiction in

12

the juvenile court needed as retribution or for public safety

13

reasons in the adult system.

14

I would characterize that is that a sentence of

Now in the juvenile court we can maintain jurisdiction

15

until a juvenile is 21-years-old.

16

offenders is that they are 16.

17

adult system, even if they are sanctioned, if they're sent to

18

prison, we find nationally that the length of stay for juvenile

19

offenders transferred to the adult system is a little over three

20

years.

21

They will still be very young when they are returned to the

22

community, and the question is, how are we going to be returning

23

them to the community.

24
25

The average age for these

When they are transferred to the

The reality is they will be returned to the community.

The next question that we have to ask is did the
transfer to adult court actually reduce the crime component or
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future crime that will be committed.

2

studies of transfer laws across the country.

3

for that is in the early '80 1 s and the early '90 1 s, which is

4

or excuse me, the late '80 1 s, early '90's, which is when our law

5

was passed as well in its current form,

6

serious increase in concern about juvenile crime in the country,

7

particularly a lot of offenders who were repeat offenders and

8

very serious.

9

they expected these juveniles to become just very serious

There have been a lot of
One of the reasons

I should say, there was a

They kind of coined the phrase super predator, and

10

dangerous criminals, and so these laws were passed to remove them

11

from the juvenile court system, to deal with them in the adult

12

system, and to -- essentially the plan was to lock them up for a

13

very long period of time.

14

What we've seen since that time is that that forecast

15

hasn't really played out.

16

significantly, and what we found is that the transfer to the

17

adult system hasn't really paid off the way that we anticipated

18

that it would.

19

In fact,

the cases have diminished

For instance, soon after our law was passed, we started

20

having questions as to whether or not it was effective.

21

Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice's study of the

22

serious youth offender and transfer cases.

23

were 65 juveniles that were identified as serious youth

24

offenders.

25

about half of them were placed on probation in 2002.

In 2002

In that year there

I can go through what happened there.

In that case

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-101

Looking at the same cases for last year, we were able to

2

identify 11 total transfer cases -- now that included -- that

3

includes certification cases and serious youth offender cases.

4

There were five total serious youth offender cases last year.

5

So as we can see, these cases have dropped off

6

dramatically.

7

two of them were placed on probation.

8

on probation were -- when we look at their offenses, we can

9

assume that the judge looked at the case and said, again, this is

10

not a serious enough of an offense -- or not offense, but doesn't

11

warrant a prison sentence in this particular instance.

12

are lots of things that a district court judge takes into play

13

when they're making that sentence.

14

Out of those, three of them were placed in prison,
The two that were placed

So there

What we are trying to do with this particular amendment

15

is to not change that system altogether.

16

are very serious crimes that are committed by young people in our

17

community.

18

the juvenile court system.

19

for public safety reasons being transferred.

20

you'll always here with these laws is that they were created to

21

deal with the juveniles, the worst of the worst, and those who

22

had exhausted the resources of the juvenile court system.

23

We recognize that there

Some of those cannot be dealt with appropriately in
Some of them -- some of them warrant
The phrase that

As we can see through these factors that exist right

24

now, the juvenile's history doesn't really come into play.

25

can be the juvenile's first offense, their first interaction with
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1

the court system, and they could end up being transferred.

2

that exhausting the resources of the juvenile court system

3

doesn't become a factor.

4

So

The worst of the worst does come into play with these

5

are the worst offenses that we do see, but it doesn't necessarily

6

mean that the minor's role was the worst in them.

7

know, different facts come into each particular scenario, and we

8

need to be able to look at them.

As you all

9

My commission, as you know, is charged with maintaining

10

maximum discretion for and encouraging discretion for sentencing

11

judges.

12

need to make some improvement.

13

just that, is to provide that -- that discretion in making those

14

decisions.

15

This is one of those areas where we feel like we really
So this amendment is trying to do

As you can see, rather than a shall bind them over if

16

all of the following factors are found,

17

and this is in line 57 -- they shall bind them over unless the

18

Court finds it will be contrary to the best interest of the minor

19

and the public not to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction

20

of the district court.

21

the standard becomes --

That is an and.

So we are looking at both of these -- both of these

22

factors corning into play, particularly when I asked the two

23

questions before one can ask, how is it in the best interest of

24

the public not to bind them over.

25

will be much better served in the juvenile court system where we

We may find that the juvenile
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can provide them services that do very well at reducing

2

recidivism rather than transferring them to a system that is not

3

equipped to deal with juveniles, particularly if they are placed

4

on probation, they're not going to receive those services that

5

may help reduce their criminogenic needs in the same way that

6

they would be able to receive in the juvenile court system.

7

In reviewing transfer laws, we do find that particular

8

for violent offenses, a juvenile who is maintained in the

9

juvenile court system versus a juvenile that's transferred to the

10

criminal system or the adult system, we find consistently that

11

those who are transferred to the adult system for violent

12

offenses reoffend more frequently and sooner than those who are

13

maintained in the juvenile court system.

14

So again, recognizing that we do have a need in some

15

instances to make these transfers, we want to make sure that that

16

can happen, but we want to give the judge the opportunity to look

17

at this particular minor, their interaction with the juvenile

18

court system before, the nature of the offense before them, and

19

to make an appropriate decision as to whether or not the public

20

and the minor would be best served in the juvenile court or in

21

the criminal court system.

22

questions.

23
24

25

I think I'd be open to any

Ci)

CHAIRMAN:
a question here.

With that,

Thank you very much, Ms. Skinner.

I do have

Representative Aaron?

MS. AARON:

Thank you.

Just first question, when you
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talk about line 58, you -- both times you referred to that line

2

you said not to bindover.

3

want to make sure we're clear on that.

4
5

MS. SKINNER:

MS. AARON:

7

MS. SKINNER:

9

I

They will bindover if they find that

it -- or excuse me, unless -- there's an unless there on 56.

6

8

Yes.

There's no not in that sentence.

Right.
So unless they find it would be contrary

to the interest of the minor and to the public.
MS. AARON:

Thank you.

Could you tell me a little bit

10

about your studies in terms of -- I know some of these have an

11

age limit of 14, some of them have 16.

12

analysis of that in terms of how often they've bound over?

13

MS. SKINNER:

Have you done any

These are age limits for the statutes

14

themselves, so because of the different nature of the statutes,

15

it -- the presumption is a little bit different.

16

certification cases aren't filed nearly as frequently.

17

14 years of age or older.

18

are -- are filed.

So
This is

They're not filed as frequently, but

19

When they are, cases that I looked at from last year,

20

they were all bound over, but I don't have -- I can't say with

21

I can't say that there weren't others that were considered to be

22

filed that way that -- this isn't making any sense as I'm saying

23

this, but those numbers didn't show up because they didn't reach

24

the transfer level, and so they maintained themselves in the

25

juvenile court system.
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1

So those that we looked over and in talking with

2

prosecutors and defense attorneys, I'm not aware of any from last

3

year -- I can say that -- that were not bound over.

4

usually at -- done after giving a lot of thought and large

5

hearings that are placed on.

6

Those are

With the serious youth offender, again it does -- pardon

7

me.

8

that are bound over that we're looking at.

9

this comes from both judges and from prosecutors is that when

It does depend on their age.

Now again, these are the cases
What we do know, and

10

they look at a child, one who may be younger or has lesser

11

culpability, that oftentimes because the statute is so

12

restrictive, they're finding other ways to make their way around

13

the statute.

14

the list, or they will come to some other kind of agreement in

15

order to avoid this, because the statute really does require that

16

transfer.

So they'll file one of the charges that is not on

Does that answer your question?

17

MS. AARON:

18

CHAIRMAN:

19

20

Yes, it does.

Do we have any other questions?

Representative Hall?
MR. HALL:

Could you just discuss the fiscal note that

21

we have related to this bill?

22

Representative Snow.

23

Thank you very much.

MS. SKINNER:

I don't -- either Ms. Skinner or

Ii)
There is a fiscal note on the bill.

24

is coming from juvenile justice services.

25

that -- a couple of things.

This

They are estimating

They're estimating that with the --
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1

with the change to the statute that there will be more cases

2

filed.

3

will give some discretion.

4

outside of the statute in an effort to avoid the requirements

5

will now be filed under the particular statute, so the cases may

6

increase.

7

I can only assume that this would be because the statute
Those cases that are now being filed

What I can tell you, though, is that they are cases that

8

if they're trying to avoid the statute to begin with, I think

9

they're the cases that both the prosecutor and the judge feel

10

like may be retained under this particular statute given that

11

option.

12

that are already staying in the juvenile court system.

13

So I don't think that it would increase.

Those are kids

What JJS is estimating is that with this statute there

14

will be juveniles who are currently being sent to the district

15

court system who will be maintained in the juvenile court system,

16

and accordingly, they will need to provide services for those

17

juveniles.

18

estimating that most of those will go to secure care.

19

their estimate.

20

21
22

So that's what the fiscal note is based on.

MR. HALL:

They're
That is

Do you have any reason to disagree with the

amount?
MS. SKINNER:

It's really hard to know.

As I said

23

before, we don't know how many cases will -- each year the cases

24

differ, and we do expect that they will be changed a little bit.

25

In my -- in looking at the cases that have been filed over the
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1

last few years, we do have a large number of those cases where

2

the juveniles really do~'t have any prior history at all.

3

When they are transferred to the adult system, their cases are

4

greatly -- in the course of a plea bargain greatly reduced.

5

Like I said, they're placed on probation in many

6

cases.

7

offenders, and it's hard to know what would happen with them in

8

the juvenile court system, if the Court would them to secure

9

care, and if all of these juveniles are retained and are sent to

10
11

Those juveniles are what I would classify as lower risk

secure care, then that probably is an accurate estimate.
If they are not, if they are retained and placed on

12

probation or given some other services, to that

13

the fiscal note would arise to that amount.

14

I don't think

It's also, as I said, difficult to know the numbers.

15

They're estimating -- I can't remember if it's four or six

16

juveniles that will be retained in addition to those that are

17

currently retained.

18

cases total, and so it's hard to know where those will coming

19

from -- will be coming from.

20

MR. HALL:

21

MR. LOWRY:

As I said, last year we had a total of five

Thank you.
Can I weigh on that a little bit, too?

I

22

certainly don't have the background that the director has, but I

23

think the feeling is anecdotally that for those whose -- when

24

jurisdiction is transferred to the district court and those

25

juveniles or those offenders are placed on probation, the
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probation department for adults is really not equipped to deal

2

specifically or as well for juvenile offenders as juvenile

3

probation officers.

4

So while there may be some savings at that point,

5

ultimately there is a high risk that we're going to see those

6

folks back into the system, as Ms. Skinner as already alluded to.

7

So ultimately, and in the long run we think that there is a good

8

chance that the State is going to spend more money as those youth

9

offenders mature and they -- and their issues are not addressed,

10

we're going to see them again and it's going to cost more money

11

in the long run.

Does that make sense?

12

MR. HALL:

Sure.

13

CHAIRMAN:

Any other questions?

Thank you.
I have one as the

14

chair.

15

about juvenile court -- or juvenile facilities being shut down.

16

Will -- on the fiscal note, are we going to be able to help the

17

juvenile facility folks be able to deal with some of the issues

18

that we're so concerned with in not shutting some of these

19

facilities down and giving them the resources to deal with the

20

problems that they don't have?

21

MS. SKINNER:

I'm just curious, I mean I know we've been talking a lot

Do you happen to know?

I'm sure any resources that are allotted

22

to their system will be helpful in helping them maintain this.

23

These -- the estimates here are for juveniles that are placed in

24

secure care and in community based placements.

25

estimates that they maintain.

Those are the

I'm not sure if the money that
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1

would be dedicated based on this particular offense would be

2

dedicated to those facilities or those programs, or if they could

3

be used for some of the other programs.

4

would -- how that would play out.

5

CHAIRMAN:

I'm not sure how that

I can find out for you.

That would be great.

The other concern I

6

would have is -- I mean there's been talk last year, we almost

7

had one of our facilities shut down, and obviously we're going

8

this direction, which I think is a worthy direction to go in, but

9

if you suddenly shut down a facility and then we'd have no place

10

to put these -- these youth,

11

system, so I'm just kind of -- wanted to make sure on that.

12

MS. SKINNER:

13

CHAIRMAN:

that creates a huge bind in our

It does, yes.

Any other questions?

Do we have anybody in

14

the audience that would like to address this issue?

15

forward and state your name.

16

MR. GORDON:

Please come

I'm Ron Gordon, the executive director of

17

the commission on criminal and juvenile justice.

18

serious youth offender law was passed in 1996.

19

involved in the law at that time, and we've remained involved

20

with this while over the course of those intervening 17 years.

21

The original
My office was

We've made a number of relatively minor changes to the

22

law over the -- that time, and I'm here today in support.

23

commission, my office supports this bill as an important change

24

to ensure the integrity of the serious youth offender law.

25

My

The point of the law is to find appropriate ways to
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address the most serious juveniles, and the current law does not

2

allow adequate flexibility.

3

is bringing forth strikes a very delicate balance between

4

providing additional discretion to juvenile court judges in

5

certain circumstances, while also maintaining public safety.

6

focus of the bill remains public safety.

7

So the bill that Representative Snow

The

A juvenile court judge is not permitted to retain a

8

juvenile if that harms public safety or is not in the best

9

interest of public safety.

It does permit the juvenile court

10

some discretion to retain some juveniles when it is not a threat

11

to the public safety and will provide in better services being

12

delivered to that juvenile, which only increases the overall

13

public safety.

14

So my commission stands in full support of the bill.

15

We extend appreciation to Representative Snow for bringing this

16

forward to the sentencing commission for studying it over many

17

years, and as I said before, it strikes a delicate balance

18

between the discretion that's necessary to make these very

19

difficult decisions while also maintaining public safety.

20

21
22

CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

Seeing none, thank you.
MR. BOYDEN:

Any questions for Mr. Gordon?

Anybody else?

Oh, yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Paul Boyden,

23

executive director of Statewide Association of Prosecutors.

24

have been involved in this issue, obviously, for a long time.

25

helped draft the original 18 years ago, and these retention
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1

factors have been a concern all along.

2

sentencing commission, and of course involved with the prosecutor

3

for that length of time.

4

This is not a minor change.

I've been on the

This is significant.

We're

5

talking about changing these factors so that the Court -- so that

6

the discretion goes to the Court, because de facto the way it

7

operates right now is the prosecutors are kind of making the

8

decision on what to charge as to whether this is going to end up

9

in the adult court or the juvenile court.

10

Nobody likes to give up power, of course.

That would

11

include prosecutors, but we do understand that this is the kind

12

of thing where really the judges need a little more discretion on

13

this kind of thing.

14

factors because they just are -- they have been a problem all

15

along, and so we really need to deal with those issues.

16

We need to -- we need to adjust these

The big concern we have is we just -- we're trusting the

17

juvenile court judges at this time to make those decisions, and

18

particularly to take into account the needs of the public because

19

in criminal prosecution, it's very important for the public to

20

feel that justice is being done.

21

juveniles should be tried as adults, and that's an important

22

issue for justice to be done.

23

In some cases they feel that

So we're probably never going to be entirely through

24

with tweaking these issues, but we certainly don't oppose this.

25

We've been involved in the process all along for a very long
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2

time.

Thank you.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you, Mr. Boyden.

Do we have any

3

questions?

4

not, I'll bring it back to the committee for any other clarifying

5

questions.

6

summation.

7

No.

Thank you.

Anyone else from the audience?

If

If not, we'll go back to Representative Snow for

MR. SNOW:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say that

8

I appreciate Director Skinner and for all of her work and the

9

work of the commission and all those who have helped coordinate

10

on drafting this bill.

11

they have indicated -- those that have spoke today -- this is

12

something that's been thought through for a long period of time.

13

It's supported by Statewide Association of Prosecutors, CCJJ,

14

Utah Sentencing Commission and the Council of Juvenile Court

15

Judges in this state, so it has -- it has broad support.

16

This has been a long process, and I think

It's a good change.

It allows in a very narrow

17

situation discretion on the part of the juvenile court judges

18

and by the way, we have some great judges sitting on our juvenile

19

court benches.

20

in whether in making a proper decision on whether or not to

21

transfer jurisdiction to adult court in those situations where

22

the best interests of the public will be served, as well as the

23

best interests of the minor.

24

appropriate change.

25

policy, and I would look for support from the committee.

It offers in a very narrow situation discretion

So I believe that it's an

It's a good change in our judicial criminal
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you, Mr. Chairman.

2

(Conclusion of Mr. Snow's comments)

3

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

4

MADAME CLERK:

5

amendments.

House Bill 105.

House Bill 105, serious youth offender

Senator Hillyard?

6

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

7

MR. HILLYARD:

Senator Hillyard?

In juvenile court we have a provision for

8

serious youth offenders which requires them to be certified as

9

adults, and it's usually somebody 16, 17-years-old who have

10

committed a horrific crime.

11

statute has been drawn it's pretty well automatic.

12

amendment makes it more discretionary with the Court, because

13

some of the kids are being certified over.

14

adult court are just released on probation and not given help

15

that the juvenile court can give and structure to do.

16

The problem has been the way the
This

When they get in

So this is brought to us by the CCJJ in a leveling

17

influence to allow a little bit more discretion in the juvenile

18

court to make sure that the people who should be punished are

19

punished, and those who may need some treatment (inaudible)

20

process have that opportunity.

21

questions.

22
23

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

Be glad to respond to any

Thank you, Senator.

Questions for

Senator Hillyard?

24

MR. HILLYARD:

25

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

I'll call for question on the bill.
Seeing none -- and the question is
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shall House Bill 105 pass?

Roll call vote.

2

{Conclusion of Senator Hillyard's remarks)

3

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

4

MADAME CLERK:

5

amendments, Representative Snow.

6

judiciary with a vote of 7-0-2.

House Bill 105, serious youth offender

7

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

8

MR. SNOW:

9

Madame reading clerk?

This bill was heard in

Representative Snow.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

As this body

knows, our criminal justice system in the State of Utah is

10

divided into two parts, one that deals with adult offenders and

11

one that deals with juvenile offenders.

12

deals with juvenile offenders whose crimes alleged are serious

13

enough that a prosecutor who is prosecuting those may feel

14

inclined to transfer them to adult court to stand trial as an

15

adult and ultimately be sentenced, and perhaps even incarcerated

16

as an adult.

17

This particular bill

Now currently in Utah there are three ways that can be

18

accomplished.

19

process, and let me tell you why I'm bringing the bill.

20

that process as it exists today, an offender -- a youth offender

21

who qualifies, over the age of 16, and who has committed one of

22

the offenses enumerated, fairly serious offenses at lines 31

23

through 44, his case or her case can be transferred to adult

24

court after a hearing is held in juvenile court before the

25

juvenile court judge, and as long as certain elements are met.

House Bill 105 deals only with one particular
Under
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Now if those elements are met, the juvenile court judge

2

sitting and hearing the case has no discretion except to bind

3

that young person over to stand trial as an adult.

4

rigidity in the bill that prompts me bringing -- or excuse me, it

5

is that rigidity in the existing law that prompts me bringing

6

this bill.

7

It is that

Now I will tell you that this bill that is before you

8

has been worked on at least for two years.

9

the commission on criminal and juvenile justice, the Utah

It is supported by

10

sentencing commission, the Utah Juvenile Justice Service, and

11

also by the Statewide Association of Prosecutors.

12

What does the bill do?

It keeps in place the procedure

13

where those who have been charged with serious offenses can still

14

be transferred to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court;

15

however, it broadens the discretion of the Court.

16

Now why is that necessary?

Under the current rigid

17

structure, we actually have unintended consequences where a

18

juvenile under this scenario who meets those requirements, maybe

19

has very limited involvement with the juvenile court previously,

20

but meets those elements, could be transferred to the district

21

court, and either plead guilty or be found guilty and then stand

22

before that Court for sentencing.

23

The problem with the current system is the -- if the

24

offense is not of such a magnitude that the Court would be

25

inclined to impose a jail sentence or imprisonment on that
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juvenile, the Court most likely is inclined to order probation.

2

The problem with that scenario is our adult probation in this

3

state is not really equipped to deal with a juvenile -- juvenile

4

supervision.

5

As a result, and as an unintended consequence,

6

those serious youth offenders who then are transferred to a

7

probation -- adult probation -- have very limited supervision.

8

Their supervision terminates after a period of time, and the

9

youth offender is not really -- and his or her issues are not

10

really addressed, at least to the same extent that they would be

11

under a juvenile court supervised probation.

12

Now the standard by which a juvenile court judge making

13

that determination is fairly significant.

14

judge before they would retain this offender in juvenile court

15

would have to make two findings, one that it's in the best

16

interest of the juvenile, that jurisdiction be retained in the

17

juvenile court, and the second, that it's in the best interest of

18

the safety and welfare of the citizens of this state.

19

fairly narrow band in which a juvenile offender would -- who had

20

committed some serious offense whose jurisdiction would be

21

retained.

The juvenile court

So it's a

22

The benefit would be on retention in the juvenile court

23

system whether it -- whether it required detention or whether it

24

required supervision is our system in this state is then able to

25

address the needs of that juvenile, and the likelihood of
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1

reoffending is much less.

2

the country that in cases where a juvenile is tried as an adult

3

and then is put on probation as an adult -- under adult

4

supervision, the recidivism, the rate at which they reoffend is

5

higher than if that same juvenile were maintained under the

6

jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

7

In fact, the statistics show across

Now that's a lot of talking to say that this bill

8

provides additional discretion to our juvenile court judges to

9

make the right decision in deciding whether or not to transfer a

10

juvenile offender for serious offenses to the district court to

11

stand trial or to be sentenced.

12

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

13
14
15
16

SPEAKER PRO TEM:
Discussion to the bill?
MR. KING:

Representative King?
Will the

sponsor yield?
SPEAKER PRO TEM:

18

MR. LOWRY:

19

MR. KING:

21

Thank you, Representative Snow.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

17

20

I'm ready to take questions.

Will the sponsor yield?

Yes, sure.

If you could, Representative, could you

explain for us the fiscal note?
MR. LOWRY:

There is a fiscal note that is appended to

22

this bill, and I think if you -- you each have a copy of that.

23

The fiscal bill current impact appears based on meetings that has

24

been held with the fiscal analyst as recently as this afternoon

25

is that that impact is probably going to be reduced, and I
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1

don't -- you don't have it front of you in writing, but I believe

2

it's going to be reduced to about $50,000.

3

Now it is true there is an impact, but if we -- we have

4

to decide, I suppose, from policy standpoint whether or not the

5

long term costs and risks associated with moving those juvenile

6

offenders who commit serious offenses to the adult system, their

7

chances of reoffending, and there's a saying among juvenile court

8

officers and those who supervise juveniles, and it goes something

9

like this.

Once we take a juvenile and we put them in a certain

10

environment -- in jail or in prison with adults, criminals -- you

11

have almost certainly created another criminal and a serious

12

criminal once that juvenile is released.

13

So while it is true that, Representative, that there is

14

a fiscal note, my understanding is No. 1, it can be mitigated,

15

and No. 2, it's my position that this is a good policy, and we'll

16

have to deal with that, but it's good policy for the State in the

17

long run to assume that cost rather than creating long range

18

issues that we're going to have to deal with later.

19

MR. KING:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

I want to

20

address that point.

21

look carefully at the fiscal note is there is some savings to the

22

cost of administering the adult justice system because of this,

23

and there is some additional expenditure to the juvenile justice

24

system.

25

more money on the juvenile justice system with these kids.

One of the things that you'd look at if you

I don't -- it's not troubling to me that we're spending
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2

think this is a great bill.
I commend the bill sponsor for his work on this because

3

giving greater discretion to keep juveniles out of the adult

4

system who should in the minds of those working in the juvenile

5

system be kept in the juvenile system is -- increases the

6

likelihood that we're going to be able to have those kids given

7

the resources that they need to keep them from reoffender, to

8

keep them from recidivating.

That's a positive thing.

This is,

9

in my mind, an investment in the future of these kids.

I'm glad

10

to hear that the fiscal note is lower than what the bill sponsor

11

originally obtained.

12

I think that's a good thing, but I don't want the body

13

to be deterred by the existence of a fiscal note at all, because

14

the resources that we're talking about are going in to helping

15

rehabilitate these kids before they become habitual offenders or

16

become -- or before they become adults.

17

your support of this bill.

18
19
20

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

So I would encourage

Thank you.
Further discussion to the bill,

Representative Mciff?
MR. MCIFF:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

I wish to

21

offer a simple analogy to make a point.

22

horseman, you have to know when to pull back on the reins and

23

when to ease off, but you can never know that until you're in

24

the saddle and you see what the horse does.

25

applies to young peopie.

If you want to be a good

That same concept

It is impossible for us to statutorily
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fix whether a youth should be tried as an adult or as a juvenile,

2

and that decision cannot be fairly and realistically made until

3

you're in the saddle, and the youth is before the Court, the

4

Court can evaluate all the considerations related to this young

5

person and the offense that's been committed.

~

is sound public policy, and we should support the bill.

7

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

8

discussion to the bill?

9

summation.

10

MR. SNOW:

So I agree, this

Representative Mciff.

Further

Seeing none, Representative Snow for

Thank you.

In summary, No. 1, this does not

11

change or do away with the process that we have in our state

12

where some serious youth offenders ought to be tried as an adult,

13

and in some cases in very egregious cases ought to -- ought to be

14

incarcerated as an adult.

15

That still remains in place.

The second thing, this bill, as has been mentioned,

16

provides some discretion -- addition discretion to juvenile court

17

judges to help make a decision that's in the best interest of the

18

person charged, but also in the best interests of the public.

19

The third thing that I'd mention with respect to the fiscal bill,

20

one way or another, whether that juvenile is going to supervised

21

or incarcerated as an adult or supervised as a juvenile, there is

22

going to be a cost.

23

There is a little more -- there is -- not a little more.

24

There is a greater cost in the structure that we build with

25

respect to supervising and rehabilitating juveniles, but in the
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1

long run, I believe it's money well spent in the state, and I

2

urge your support.

3

4
5

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

Thank you, Representative Snow.

Voting is open on House Bill 105.
(Conclusion of Mr. Lowry's statements)
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Utah Session Laws of the 2013 l,eglslatlve Session
HB 105, Chapter 186
Be It enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section l. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read:

78A-6-702. Serious youth offender -- Procedure.
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall
filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses:
(a) any felony violation of:
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson:
(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another;

(Iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [k:ldflapiflg)

kidnappjng;

(Iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm:

(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or

(b) an offense other than those listed In Subsection (1 )(a) involving the use of a dangerous weapon... which would be a felony if committed b
been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon.._which also would have been a felony If co
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules e!

Court.
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed In Subsection (1 ), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its c,
establish probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (l) has been committed and that the defendant committed it

(l )(b), the state shall have the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has previously been adj1
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon.
(b) If the Juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be boun,
district court in the same manner as an adult unless the Juvenile court judge finds that [all ef the fellooiflg eonelitior1s exist:] jt would be co
mjnor and to the public to bing over the defendant to the jur;sdictjon of the district ,ourt

Cc) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b) the judge shall consider only the following:

4j

http://cascmakerlegal.com/bDocView.aspx'?categoryAlias=ACTS&state=UT&strdataTypc=ACl'&catCalled=Acts&slalecd=lIT&sessionyr=20I3&actid=HB%20105...
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Casc:makn

I0!?./20!7
(i) whethe_r the minor has

l11er] been previously adjudicated delinouent fo~ an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapo:1 which woult

{ ..... ,l,.

(ii) [th-at] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons,~ the minor appears to have a

greater Qr lesser degree of cul

{i:lfld]
(iii) [tl'tttt]

the .exteot tQ,wbi<;h

the minor's role in the offense was [net] committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:t

{iv) the number and na~ure of the minor's prior. adjudications in the jµvenile co~Jrt· and
(v}

~hether public safety is better serv~d by apjudlc;atjng t.he roi_oqr in the iuxen_Ue court or in the d;stciCl cou_rt

[(€),].@ Once the state has met its burden under [tht5-] Subsection (3)00 as to a showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the bu,
presenting evidence [as to tl,e existenee .e,f the abe .. e eonditions] tbat in ljght gf the consideratjgns_ ljsted in Subsectiqn <~)Ccl jt wc;>yld be c
minor and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdi~tion of the district court.

[Ml f.el If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [all the above eenditien:; are satisfied,] jt wgyld be contrarv tc
and the. best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdictign of the district ~urt the court shall so state In Its findings
as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though It were a juvenile petition.
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the state has not met its burden of proving the other crite
over under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court Judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the informatlc
petition.

(i

(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall Issue.
The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile courtjud~
initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, the preliminary examination held by thejuvenile cou
finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant committed It, but the Juvenile cot
with this section regarding the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3}(b).
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the<
charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged,
together with those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the defe
defendant shall also be bound over to the district court to answer for those charges.

(ti];\

181

(8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services an•
is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felc
except as provided in Subsection (12).
(9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult In the district court under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned b~
preliminary examination in the district court.

(i)

(1 O) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense i
weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court.
(11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any other offense arising from the same crlmlnal episode, t
jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.
(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previous
there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.
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tUJLE 1.2 - Promntini!' Confidence in the Judici;1rv
A judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes - and shall not undermine - public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciaiy and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
,.,

'I

-

COMMENT
[1J Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of
impropriery. This princi.ple applies to both the professional and personal conduct ofajudge.
[2] A judge should expect to be the subfect ofpublic scrutiny that might be viewed as burdensome if applied to
other citizens, and must accept the restrictions imposed by the Code.
{3J Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integri"!], and impartiali!J ofa
judge undmnines public confidence in the judiciary. Because it is not practicable to list all such conduct, the
Rule is necessari/y cast in general terms.
[4JJudges shouldparticipate in activities that promote ethical conduct amongjudges and laU!Jers, support
professionalism within the judiciary and the legalprofession, andpromote access tojustice far all.
[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law or provisions of this Code. The testfor appearance of
impropriery is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge engaged in
impropriery.
[6} A judge should initiate and participate in communiry outreach activitiesfar the purpose ofpromoting
public understanding ofand confidence in the administration ofjustice. In conducting such activities, the judge
must act in a ,nanner consistent with this Code.

RULE 2.11- Disqualification

(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following
circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or
personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner
of such a person is:
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managmg member, or
trustee of a party;

(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
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(c) a person who has more than a de rninimis interest that could be substantially affected by
the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse,
domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judge's family residing .ip. the
judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding.
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party's lawyer, or
the law firm of a party's lawyer has within the previous three years made aggregate
contributions to the judge's retention in an amount that is greater than $50.
(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than
in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the
judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.
(6) The judge:
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who
participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;

(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and
substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly
expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in
controversy;
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or
(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court and is now acting as a
judge who would hear the appeal or trial de novo.

(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests,
and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the
judge's spouse or domestic partner and mmor children residing in the judge's household.

(C) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under
paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may
ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court
personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and
lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should
not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be
incorporated into the record of the proceeding.

COMMENT
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[1] Under this Rule, ajudge is disqttalified 111he11cver the judge's impartiality might reasonab!J be questioned,
regardless of whether Of!J the specific provisions ofparagraphs (A)(1) through (6) appfy.

~r

[2} A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applz'es regardless
of whether a motion to disqualify is filed
[3] The rule of necessity may ovenidc the rule of disqualification. ror example, ajudge might be required to
participate in judicial revie1v ofajztdicial salary statute, or might be the on!Jjudge available in a matter
requiring immediatejudicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In
matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible
disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to anotherjudge as soon as practicable.
{4] A judge is disqualified in proceedings involving a law firm that employs the judge's spouse, domestic
partner, parent, or child, or e11!J other member of the judge's fami!J residing in the judge's household as an
equity holder in the law firm. A judge is not disqualified in other situations unless the judge's impartiali'!]
might reasonab!J be questioned under paragraph (A), or a relative is known by the judge to have an interest
in the law firm that could be substantial!J affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(C).
[5} A judge should disclose on the record info1111ation that the judge believes the parties or their la1J!Yers might
reasonabfy consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualijication, even if the judge believes there is no basis
for disqualification.
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Tab 8 - Order Granting Certiorari and Pennitting Issues Raised as Alternate
Grounds for Affirmance
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The Order of the Court is slated below:
Dated: July 05, 2017
Isl Thomas R. Lee
Associate Chief Justice
I 0:24:03 AM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH
---00000---

State of Utah,
Petitioner,
ORDER
V.

Appellate Case No. 20170304-SC
Cooper John Anthony Van Huizen,
Respondent.

This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on April 19,
2017.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the following issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Respondent was not required
to demonstrate presetvation of his appellate claim that the juvenile court judge should
have disqualified herself.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a litigant is not required to
show prejudice arising from an appearance of bias if a judge fails to disclose the facts
generating the appearance of bias.
1.

The cross-petition for writ of certiorari is denied but the Cross-Petitioner may raise the
issues identified in the cross-petition as alternate grounds for affirmance.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Court suspends the provision of Rule 26(a) that permits the
parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their briefs on the merits. The
parties shall not be permitted to stipulate to an extension. The parties shall comply with
the briefing schedule upon its issuance.
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